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I. Introduction 
 
With New York’s enactment of the Raise the Age law, the 
State’s Legislature codified the omnipresent notion that 
juveniles processed in the criminal justice system should be 
treated differently than adults given that they are inherently 
less culpable for a multitude of reasons, both measurable and 
incalculable.  Flaws emanating from the minutiae of the Raise 
the Age law have surfaced since it became effective on October 
1, 2018, as criminal matters involving sixteen-year-old offenders 
have been adjudicated in courts following the newly introduced 
procedures for removal of cases involving these youth to Family 
Court, or the newly-created Youth Part.  Simultaneously, 
adjudications of matters in which applicants have turned to the 
courts to seal their criminal convictions pursuant to the Raise 
the Age legislation have also revealed gaps between the law’s 
intent and its execution since implementation.  Presiding judges 
have responded by bridging the gap between the legislation and 
its execution from the bench in accordance with the progressive, 
rehabilitative orientation of the Raise the Age law through 
developing case law.  This Article will first provide background 
regarding New York’s juvenile justice system, which provides 
context for the introduction and recent enactment of the Raise 
the Age law, before explaining the complexities of the legislation 
itself.  Further, it will comment on periods of New York’s 
extensive, dynamic history of juvenile justice which has reflected 
social mores through present day.  Furthermore, this article will 
delve into several key provisions and consequent issues 
materializing in the courts under these provisions, which may 
endure into the second phase of implementation of the Law for 
seventeen-year-old offenders as of October 1, 2019.  Finally, this 
article will suggest that the New York State Legislature should 
amend the Raise the Age legislation in order to better facilitate 
processing of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders’ matters, 
and sealing applications, respectively, under the law’s new 
provisions.  It is vital to the legislation’s permanency to precisely 
mirror the ubiquitous concept embodied in the spirit of the Raise 
the Age legislation and the movement that preceded it: that 
adolescents are simply different than adult offenders, and their 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9
2019 RAISE THE AGE 457 
status as such should be accorded deference by the courts of the 
State. 
 
II. A Brief History of New York’s Juvenile Justice System 
 
A. Twentieth Century New York: A Progressive Juvenile 
Justice System 
 
At common law and throughout the nineteenth century, 
criminal prosecution of a child less than fourteen years old could 
proceed only if the prosecution proved “[b]eyond all doubt and 
contradiction” that the youth could understand the distinction 
between right and wrong and could further understand the 
consequences of the illegal act.1  This doctrine became known as 
the infancy presumption and was applied in New York 
throughout the nineteenth century, embodying the era’s 
perception that juveniles required treatment and rehabilitation 
in response to wrongdoing, since those juveniles who did not 
know right from wrong, by extension, could not be deterred by 
virtue of the fact that they could not be assigned blame for their 
choices.2  To that end, separate children’s parts of the criminal 
courts of New York City were established in 1901.3  The 1922 
Children’s Court Act codified the rehabilitative focus of the 
juvenile justice system that had predicated it4 and “completed 
 
1. * Sara Gomes is a third-year law student at the Elisabeth Haub School 
of Law at Pace University, J.D. expected May 2020, and is the Executive 
Acquisitions Editor for Pace Law Review. She intends to pursue a career in 
matrimonial and family law post-graduation. Sara would like to extend her 
wholehearted gratitude to her professors and colleagues on Pace Law Review 
for their invaluable time, effort, and advice in composing this Article. 
Merril Sobie, The Family Court: An Historical Survey, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 53, 53 
(1988). This burden of proof was very difficult to sustain, leading to few 
reported prosecutions. Id.  
2.  Id. at 54; BARRY C. FELD & PERRY L. MORIEARTY, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL 40-41 (4th ed. 2018). 
3.  Sobie, supra note 1, at 55. 
4.  See Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 
30 PACE L. REV. 1061, 1066-71 (2014) (discussing how nineteenth century New 
York allowed convicted juveniles to be placed in privately-maintained Houses 
of Refuge instead of punitive, state-owned jails or prisons so juveniles could 
participate in rehabilitative programs until they reached majority) 
[hereinafter Sobie, Pity the Child]; Merril Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: 
Effectiveness and Impact on the New York Juvenile Justice System, N.Y. L. SCH. 
L. REV. 677, 677-84 (1981) [hereinafter Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act]. See 
3
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the divorce between juvenile and criminal courts” by removing 
all youth under the age of sixteen from the jurisdiction of the 
criminal court system and the procedural safeguards it afforded 
for juvenile defendants.5  The Children’s Court Act provided for 
the separation of children from adult offenders, showcasing that, 
even in the early twentieth century, New York recognized that 
placing juveniles in adult prisons was inappropriate: “No child 
coming within the provisions of the act shall be placed . . . [in] 
any prison, jail, lockup, or other place where such child can come 
into contact at any time or in any manner with any adult who 
has been convicted of a crime, or who is under arrest.”6  
Notwithstanding the physical separation of juveniles from 
adults, a 1927 Court of Appeals decision held that criminal due 
process standards applied to delinquency actions, including a 
“definite charge, a hearing, competent proof, and a judgement. 
Anything less [would be] arbitrary power.”7 
However, in the 1930s, New York Children’s Courts began 
to adopt the informality associated with the social work model of 
juvenile justice, as exemplified by the case of People v. Lewis, a 
New York Court of Appeals decision that stripped juvenile 
delinquents of the right against self-incrimination and replaced 
the due process standards the Court had instituted four years 
earlier with the less rigorous evidentiary standards of civil 
cases.8  People v. Lewis also marked the beginning of the 
informal parens patriae system.9  The legal doctrine of parens 
patriae demarcated the State’s right and responsibility to 
substitute its own control for that of the natural parent(s) and 
provided it the formal justification to intervene when parents 
appeared unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities, or 
when a child was deemed to pose a problem for the community.10  
 
generally FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
5.  See Sobie, supra note 1, at 54-55; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1, 
§ 2 (James C. Cahill 1928) (repealed 1962) (defining “juvenile delinquency” as 
pertaining to “any child under the age of sixteen years.”). 
6.  CRIM. PROC. art. 3, § 23. 
7.  Sobie, supra note 1, at 55 (citing People v. Fitzgerald, 155 N.E. 584, 
586-88 (N.Y. 1927)). 
8.  John N. Kane, Jr., Note, Dispositional Authority and Decision Making 
in New York’s Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
925, 935 (1994) (citing People v. Lewis, 183 N.E. 353 (N.Y. 1932)); see Sobie, 
supra note 1.  
9.  Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 684. 
10.  FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, at 7. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9
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This informal system remained largely unchanged until 1962, 
when the Family Court Act (the “1962 Act”) was enacted, 
effectively reorganizing and renaming New York’s Children’s 
Courts as the Family Courts that exist today.11 
The 1962 Act incorporated several unprecedented 
provisions, including transferring exclusive jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by children over the age of seven and under 
the age of sixteen to the newly created Family Courts, and 
providing that delinquent children under the age of sixteen could 
only be confined for a maximum of eighteen months initially, 
regardless of the crime.12  Further, the 1962 Act incorporated 
procedural safeguards that the Children’s Court lacked: juvenile 
defendants were assigned counsel, permitted to conduct 
discovery, introduce evidence, and appeal adverse decisions.13  
Moreover, the 1962 Act afforded family court protections such as 
the potential for complete disposition of a case following 
probation, no mandatory sentencing requirements irrespective 
of the crime, and sealed juvenile records.14  Although the 1962 
Act provided for a criminal court judge to waive into family court 
a juvenile fifteen years or older if he had been charged with a  
capital or life-imprisonment offense, it rejected proposals to 
expand delinquency jurisdiction to eighteen-year-olds.15  Despite 
the 1962 Act’s establishment of a rehabilitative foundation for 
New York’s juvenile justice system, growing public fear of rising 
juvenile crime, and the perception that the family courts’ 
dispositions were too lenient, ushered in New York’s “get tough” 
era of juvenile justice policies that permeated the 1970s, ‘80s, 
and ‘90s.16 
 
 
11.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 936 (citing 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686 (current 
version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 111-1211 (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652)). 
12.  Id.; Jonathan Lippman, Criminal Justice Reform is Not for the Short-
Winded: How the Judiciary’s Proactive Pursuit of Justice Helped Achieve “Raise 
the Age” Reform in New York, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 241, 264-65 (2017). 
13.  Julianne T. Scarpino, Note, A Progressive State of Mind: New York’s 
Opportunity to Reclaim Justice for its Juveniles, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 845, 854-55 
(2015). 
14.  Id.; see Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 936. 
15.  Scarpino, supra note 13, at 855; Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, 
supra note 4, at 685.  
16.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 937; see FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, 
at 16-18. 
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1. New York’s Late-Twentieth Century Punitive Juvenile 
Justice System: The Juvenile Offender Acts of 1976 & 
1978 
 
During the “get tough” era, politicians and the media 
molded the perception of adolescents from vulnerable children 
to frightening “super-predators” by publicizing sound bites such 
as: “adult crime, adult time” or “old enough to do the crime, old 
enough to do the time,” in conjunction with high profile national 
cases that “fueled public outrage and spurred public debate on 
juvenile justice.”17  The 1976 Juvenile Offender Act (the “1976 
Act”) codified these sentiments and marked the most radical 
change in New York’s delinquency laws since the establishment 
of the Children’s Court in 1922.18  The 1976 Act’s community 
interest provision, which weighed the unique needs of juveniles 
against the considerations relative to community safety, sharply 
pivoted from the previous legal notions of individualized justice 
based solely on the needs and interests of the subject child.19  
Among other provisions, it created a new category of designated 
felonies,20 which carried stricter penalties for fourteen- and 
fifteen-year-olds adjudicated delinquent while maintaining 
adjudicatory and dispositional authority over these crimes in  
Family Court.21 
Merely two years later, the crimes of one of New York’s 
juveniles became sensationalized in the media, precipitating 
sweeping “tough on crime” juvenile justice reform.22  The “Baby-
Faced Butcher” was a fifteen-year-old defendant who was found 
 
17.  FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, at 17; Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 
926 n.3 (citing Patricia Edmonds & Sam V. Meddis, Crime and Punishment: Is 
the Juvenile Justice System “Creating Monsters”?, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1994, 
at 1A) (“Robert ‘Yummy’ Sandifer, 11 years old, killed a 14-year-old neighbor 
in Chicago, before being murdered himself. . . . Craig Price murdered another 
at the age of 13 by stabbing his neighbor 58 times in Rhode Island. He 
murdered two more at the age of 15 . . . .”).  
18.  Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 717. 
19.  Scarpino, supra note 13, at 856.  
20.  Designated felonies under the 1976 Act included violent crimes such 
as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, robbery, assault, rape, sodomy, and 
arson. Kane Jr., supra note 8, at 938 n.102 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8) 
(McKinney 1987) (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8) (McKinney 
through L.2019 ch. 652)). 
21.  Kane Jr., supra note 8, at 937, 939. 
22.  Scarpino, supra note 13, at 856. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9
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guilty of the murders of two subway passengers in the Bronx 
Family Court and sentenced to the maximum penalty for his 
crimes under the Juvenile Offender Act: five years of 
incarceration at a juvenile facility, with no permanent criminal 
record.23  The ensuing public outcry for harsher reform 
culminated in the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, which evidenced 
“the legislature’s outraged state of mind and thirst for 
retribution.”24 
The 1978 Juvenile Offender Act (the “1978 Act”) lowered the 
age of criminal responsibility from sixteen to fourteen-years-old 
for a wide range of crimes, and to thirteen-years-old for murder, 
vesting adult criminal courts, instead of family courts, with 
original jurisdiction over these defendants.25  Juveniles found to 
have committed one of the designated felonies defined by the 
preceding 1976 Act were deemed “Juvenile Offenders” and were 
subject to prosecution in adult court, including public hearings, 
public records, and harsher sentencing.26  For the first time since 
the nineteenth century, the 1978 Act abolished the discretionary 
power of the court to waive a criminal penalty regardless of the 
circumstances, instead demanding mandatory incarceration for 
certain violent crimes.27  Moreover, the 1978 Act expanded the 
discretion of the district attorney and judge under a “reverse 
wavier” process that provided for removal of a Juvenile Offender 
to family court if the prosecutor found that the attendant 
circumstances warranted removal, if it was more convenient to 
do so, or if there was insufficient proof to convict in adult court; 
or, as a catch-all, if the judge found removal to be “in the 
interests of justice.”28  At later stages of the prosecution, the 
 
23.  Id. at 857. 
24.  Id. at 858. 
25.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 939; Scarpino, supra note 13, at 858; Sobie, 
The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 686-87. With the Juvenile Offender 
Acts, “New York’s one-hundred-and-fifty-year history of maintaining an age 
threshold of sixteen for criminal prosecution (except for murder cases) ha[d] 
been terminated . . . .”  Id. (citing 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478, § 2 (repealed 2017)). 
26.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 939. 
27.  Id.; see also Scarpino, supra note 13, at 858. 
28.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 940. The court considered a number of 
factors when it determined whether removal was “in the interest of justice,” 
including “the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, the extent of the 
harm caused by the offense, the evidence of guilt, the history and character of 
the juvenile, and the impact the transfer [to Family Court] will have on the 
safety of the community and the victim involved.” Id. at 940 n.130.  
7
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district attorney possessed the power to preclude the removal of 
a Juvenile Offender case to family court, even if the court would 
otherwise be willing to grant a transfer.29  The reverse waiver 
process was unique to New York, since other states operated 
conversely by vesting principal jurisdiction over juvenile 
offenders in family court and permitting waiver into adult 
court.30  In the end, despite the call for harsher punishments 
echoed by the 1978 Act’s wrath of retribution for juvenile 
defendants, it failed to deter juvenile crime, left all juveniles 
prosecuted as adults with stifling criminal records, and left those 
incarcerated with adults at risk for emotional and sexual abuse, 
and criminal socialization.31  In the years following the 
enactment of the 1978 Act, New York’s juvenile justice system 
became an emblem of the tough on crime era of the late twentieth 
century and simultaneously a “paradigm [that] entrenche[d] the 
state’s youngest offenders in a correctional system designed to 
ensure that their first worst act [was] not their last.”32 
 
B. The Return of Sensible Juvenile Justice in New York: 
The Youth Court Act, the Public Outcry for Reform, and 
the Overdue Passage of the Raise the Age Law 
 
In deciding several pivotal cases throughout the twenty-
first century which buttressed expanding support for a criminal 
justice system that accounted for the innate differences between 
children and adults, the United States Supreme Court focused 
on three significant idiosyncrasies characteristic of juveniles 
which inherently reduces their level of culpability: 
(1) [an] underdeveloped sense of responsibility, which leads 
to impulsive and reckless decisions, (2) inability to remove 
[themselves] from negative influences and vulnerability to such 
negative influences and pressures, and (3) underdeveloped 
moral character, which indicates [their] actions do not 
necessarily exemplify permanent depravity.33 
 
29.  Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 698. 
30.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 940. 
31.  Scarpino, supra note 13, at 864. 
32.  Id. at 857, 885. 
33.  Id. at 865. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court removed harsh 
punishments previously imposed on juvenile offenders for decades: Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), outlawed capital punishment for convicts 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9
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This change in perception of “adolescent criminality” was 
mirrored at the state level with a widespread break from the 
zero-sum game of the 1976 and 1978 Acts due to several 
contributing factors: 
(a) a major decrease in the juvenile crime rate, and an even 
more pronounced diminution in the juvenile violent crime rate; 
(b) studies showing conclusively that treating youths as adults, 
and thereby incarcerating them in adult penal institutions —as 
opposed to juvenile facilities—dramatically increases 
recidivism; and (c) research proving that older adolescents are 
not as fully developed neurologically as adults and, as every 
parent knows innately, their ability to exercise sound judgment 
or control impulsive behavior is accordingly compromised.34 
Recognition of the commonsense notion that adolescents are 
simply different than adults sparked the push toward New 
York’s liberalization of its juvenile criminal justice system, 
albeit over the course of many years, ultimately leading to the 
passage of the “Raise the Age”  (“RTA”) law in 2017.35  The State 
Legislature’s shift in focus from the charged offense to the 
alleged offender reversed the 1976 and 1978 Acts’ fixation on 
punishment in order to promote rehabilitation of New York’s 
youth.36  Among the successful pilot programs reflecting the 
Legislature’s gradual transition toward the current 
rehabilitative-focused juvenile criminal justice system was 
Adolescent Diversion Program (“ADP”) implemented in January 
2012, which temporarily installed Youth Parts in New York’s 
criminal courts that processed sixteen- and seventeen-year-
 
under the age of eighteen; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010), and 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), invalidated the imposition of a life 
sentence without parole for non-homicide convictions and mandatory life 
sentences for offenders convicted of homicide, respectively. See also J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 372 (2011) (holding that the objective inquiry of 
whether a defendant understands his or her Miranda rights must account for 
the child’s age as “a fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about 
behavior and perception’”). 
34.  Sobie, Pity the Child, supra note 4, at 1074-75; see Stephanie 
Tabashneck, Feature, “Raise the Age” Legislation: Developmentally Tailored 
Justice, 32 CRIM. JUST. 13, 16 (2018) (“Far from ‘mini-adults,’ adolescents in 
the throes of normative development are emotionally driven, short-sighted, 
exceedingly reactive, and highly emotionally aroused.”). 
35.  Dineen Ann Riviezzo, Raise the Age New York, RAISE THE AGE NY 2, 
http://rta-ny.artiems.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Raise-the-Age-
Legislation-Summary-2017.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
36.  Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 944. 
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olds.37  By April 13, 2013, more than 3000 cases had been 
adjudicated in these Parts, resolving most cases without jail 
time or criminal records while decreasing the rate of re-arrest 
among the youth who went through the program.38  The ADP’s 
2013 study confirmed that New York’s misguided juvenile 
criminal justice procedures had become a proxy for recidivism of 
low-risk juvenile offenders.39  Further, the ADP recognized that 
the process of giving “intensive treatments to low-risk 
individuals,” had  the inadvertent effect of increasing the 
chances those juveniles would reoffend and successfully 
remedied these consequences by replacing incarceration with 
treatment, social service, or community service options geared 
toward sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.40  In the meantime, the 
Sentencing Commission had released a report finding that the 
Family Court was an unfeasible forum in which to process these 
youthful offenders at the time since, among other 
considerations, it lacked the ability to properly absorb a 
significant number of cases and procedural protections 
otherwise available in criminal court, such as a jury trial and 
access to bail.41 
During the 2012 State of the Judiciary Address, the 
Honorable Jonathan Lippman, former Chief Judge of New York, 
announced a proposal for the Youth Court Act.42  The Youth 
Court Act’s incredibly progressive provisions included: (a) 
raising the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen; (b) 
obligatory notification of juveniles’ parent or guardian 
immediately upon arrest; (c) either release to a parent or 
 
37.  MICHAEL REMPEL ET. AL., THE ADOLESCENT DIVERSION PROGRAM: A 
FIRST YEAR EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CASE PROCESSING 
FOR DEFENDANTS AGES 16 AND 17 IN NEW YORK 3 (2013), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ADP_Report_Fi
nal_0.pdf. 
38.  Lippman, supra note 12, at 264-65. 
39.  See generally Ctr. for Court Innovation, Adolescent Diversion 
Program in NY: Researchers Discuss First-Year Impacts (May 13, 2013), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/adolescent-diversion-program-
ny-researchers-discuss-first-year-impacts. 
40.  Lippman, supra note 12, at 264-65. 
41.  Id. at 265. 
42.  Id. at 266; see Jonathan Lippman, The State of the Judiciary 2012: 
Balancing the Scales of Justice (Feb. 14, 2012), https://www.ils.ny.gov/ 
files/SOJ-2012.pdf. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9
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guardian with a “special appearance ticket”43 or processing in a 
new youth division of the superior court; (d) prohibiting the 
release of juveniles’ fingerprints; (e) adjustment44 as the first 
option instead of incarceration; (f) sealing of criminal records; 
and (g) a process of removal to Family Court only after a youth 
is found guilty, to determine whether he or she required 
supervision, treatment, or confinement at that time.45  
Ultimately, the Youth Court Act lost traction after being 
referred to the Codes Committee of the New York State Senate 
both in 2012 and again as reintroduced in 2013.46 
The renewed efforts toward raising the age of criminal 
responsibility to eighteen-years-old in New York finally came to 
fruition in 2014 when Governor Andrew Cuomo announced his 
support for reform, and established the Commission on Youth, 
Public Safety, and Justice.47  The Commission’s report 
recommended that the Family Court, with judges primarily 
trained in the area of family law, be given jurisdiction over 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with nonviolent 
felonies and misdemeanors, among other low-level offenses.48  
After gaining immense support from politicians, lawmakers, and 
the public,49 and momentum in the State Assembly, the long-
 
43.  A “special appearance ticket” is a “written notice issued and 
subscribed by an officer . . . directing a designated person to appear at the 
probation service for the county in which the offense or offenses for which the 
special appearance ticket is issued were allegedly committed.” Lippman, 
Criminal Justice Reform is Not for the Short-Winded, supra note 12, at 267 
n.145; see Jellisa Joseph, Note, Catching Up: How the Youth Court Act Can 
Save New York State’s Outdated Juvenile Justice System with Regard to 
Sixteen and Seventeen-Year-Old Offenders, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 219, 232 
(2014). 
44.  “Adjustment” is a procedure under the Family Court Act that halts 
the prosecution of the juvenile on the condition that the youth person completes 
activities intended to promote positive youth development. See Susannah 
Karlsson, Raise the Age, 26 ATTICUS 11, 12 (2014). 
45.  Lippman, supra note 12, at 266-68.  
46.  See Joseph, supra note 43, at 230-39. 
47.  Lippman, supra note 12, at 273. 
48.  Id.  
49.  Eli Hager, The Fine Print in New York’s Raise the Age Law, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 14, 2017 2:24 PM), https:// 
www.themarshallproject.org/2017/04/14/the-fine-print-in-new-york-s-raise-
the-age-law (“[F]or proponents of raising the age, the goal has always been to 
keep all juveniles, accused of all crimes, out of the adult system, and to that 
extent New York’s law is a compromise stitched together in Albany after many 
years of contentious debate and Republican opposition.”). See generally Time: 
11
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awaited Raise the Age legislation was enacted on April 10, 2017, 
adopting many of the provisions of the Youth Court Act and 
bringing New York’s juvenile justice system up to speed with the 
rest of the nation.50  Thus, “[a]fter more than a century of 
treating 16- and 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice 
system, the passage of [the] Raise the Age [law] created an 
entirely new [age-appropriate] system for older adolescents.”51 
 
III. Intricacies of the Raise the Age Legislation 
 
As the penultimate state to increase the age of criminal 
accountability, the Raise the Age law hoisted New York into a 
long-awaited era of age-appropriate juvenile justice.52  Arguably, 
the most remarkable achievement of the Raise the Age 
legislation lies in its long-awaited provision that raises the 
presumptive age of juvenile accountability in New York from 
sixteen- to eighteen-years-old, effective for sixteen-year-olds as 
of October 1, 2018 and for seventeen-year-olds beginning 
October 1, 2019.53  In so doing, the law vastly changes the 
landscape for juvenile offenders in the criminal justice system, 
including: prohibiting sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from 
being held in adult jails and prisons, making substantive 
changes to the procedures and mechanisms in the criminal and 
 
The Kalief Browder Story parts I-V (Spike television broadcast Mar. 2017). 
50.  Riviezzo, supra note 35; see Act of Jan. 23, 2017, No. A.3009-C/S.2009-
C, pmbl. (“[T]o amend the criminal procedure law, the penal law, the executive 
law, the family court act, the social services law, the corrections law, the county 
law and state finance law, in relation to proceedings against juvenile and 
adolescent offenders and the age of juvenile and adolescent offenders and to 
repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto.”). 
51.  City of N.Y., One Year after Raise the Age, Misdemeanor Arrests of 16-
Year-Olds Decline 61%, NYC (Oct. 1, 2019) (quoting Admin. of Children’s 
Servs. Comm’r David A. Hansell), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/452-19/one-year-after-raise-age-de-blasio-administration-sees-
61-percent-decline-misdemeanor. 
52.  Lawrence K. Marks, Implementing ‘Raise the Age’ Legislation, 
N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 11, 2019 11:29 AM), https://www.law.com/ 
newyorklawjournal/2019/01/11/implementing-raise-the-age-legislation/. North 
Carolina was the sole state besides New York that had not raised the age of 
criminal responsibility to eighteen-years-old at the time of passing New York’s 
Raise the Age law. Id. North Carolina’s Raise the Age law took effect December 
1, 2019. Tabashneck, supra note 34; see Raise the Age – NC, N.C. DEP’T  PUB. 
SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/our-organization/juvenile-justice/key-
initiatives/raise-age-nc (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).  
53.  Riviezzo, supra note 35. 
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youth justice systems, and allowing for rehabilitative services 
for youth, including altering the type of placement and/or 
detention juveniles may be ordered to receive.54  In addition, 
parental notification of arrest will now be required for sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-olds in police custody.55 
 
A. The “Adolescent Offender” Designation, Youth Part 
Jurisdiction, and the Removal Procedure under the 
Raise the Age Legislation 
 
The RTA law created a new class of juvenile offenders, the 
“Adolescent Offender” (“AO”) class, which is statutorily defined 
as “a person charged with a felony committed on or after October 
first, two thousand eighteen when he or she was sixteen years of 
age or on or after October first, two thousand nineteen, when he 
or she was seventeen years of age.”56  The preexisting Juvenile 
Delinquent (“JD”) classification was also extended to include 
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds charged with misdemeanor 
offenses who will be processed in Family Court pursuant to 
existing JD laws, save a few exceptions for those charged with 
more heinous crimes.57  If the State charges an AO as an adult, 
he or she will be subject to treatment as a Youthful Offender, 
meaning (s)he will be processed in the new “Youth Parts” of 
criminal courts like other AOs, but will be subject to adult 
sentencing laws, as was the law prior to the passage of the RTA 
legislation.58  However, if the State does not deem the AO a 
Youthful Offender, the judge then presiding over AO cases in the 
Youth Part must take the youth’s age into account when 
 
54.  See generally Raise the Age: Overview and Implementation, N.Y. 
STATE, https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/RTAWebsite 
Presentation.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Raise the Age 
Overview]. 
55.  Id. 
56.  N.Y. CPL § 1.20(44) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652); see Raise the 
Age Implementation: Adolescent Offender, N.Y. STATE, https://www.ny.gov/ 
raise-age/raise-age-implementation#adolescent-offender (last visited Nov. 3, 
2019). 
57.  Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6. 
58.  Id.; see Michael A. Corriero, Judging Children as Children: 
Reclaiming New York’s Progressive Tradition, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1413, 
1414-15 (2011/12). 
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sentencing.59,60 
Further, under the RTA law, processing in the Youth Part 
allows for voluntary probation services tailored to AOs and other 
juvenile offenders and carries a presumption against 
detention.61  This feature of the new law departs from prior 
tough on crime practices which failed to render social services, 
including educational, physiological, and social service 
programs, which were previously solely available to juveniles 
processed in Family Courts.62  Should detention be ordered pre-
trial, specialized secure juvenile detention facilities—created 
pursuant to the guidelines of the RTA law and reserved 
exclusively for AOs—will  house the AOs in units separate from 
JDs and/or Juvenile Offenders,63 a sharp departure from the 
housing requirements under previous state laws that landed 
teenagers on Rikers Island with adult offenders even prior to a 
determination of their guilt.64  Judges will have the discretion to 
order that AOs sentenced to less than one year serve their 
 
59.  Riviezzo, supra note 35, at 22. This notion coincides with Supreme 
Court cases such as In re Gault and its progeny, which recognized that age is 
a pertinent factor in a myriad of juvenile criminal matters. See sources cited 
supra note 34. 
60.  In other words, sentencing determinations for AOs who are not 
characterized as Youthful Offenders will be made cognizant of the RTA’s 
recognition that their punishment should be commensurate with their 
blameworthiness, which it recognizes to be tied to their age, while Youthful 
Offenders will not be afforded such considerations by the court pursuant to 
statute though they too are younger than eighteen-years-old.  
61.  Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 13. AO cases processed in 
Family Court may still be allowed to divert their case from a prosecutor’s office 
to a probation through a process called “adjustment,” which has been available 
prior to RTA for JDs. Scarpino, supra note 14, at 879-80. 
62.  Corriero, supra note 58, at 1416. 
63.  Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6; Riviezzo, supra note 35, 
at 27. Youth whose cases are heard in Family Court will be detained or placed 
in Office of Children and Family Services (“OCFS”) operated, OCFS-licensed, 
or Administration for Children’s Services facilities, as JDs currently are. Raise 
the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6. 
64.  See Samantha A. Mumola, The Concrete Jungle: Where Dreams Are 
Made of . . . and Now Where Children Are Protected, 39.1 PACE L. REV. 539, 
540-42 (2019); see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993-2015, NEW 
YORKER (June 7, 2015) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-
browder-1993-2015 (discussing the high-profile story of Kalief Browder). 
Browder faced years of violence and solitary confinement on Rikers Island in 
connection with his arrest for allegedly stealing a backpack, for which charges 
were eventually dropped; after his release and the publicization of his story, 
Browder committed suicide in 2015. Id. 
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sentences in these specialized juvenile detention facilities.65  
AOs who are sentenced to state imprisonment will be placed in 
AO facilities specially developed by the State in conjunction with 
government social service offices.66 
The Youth Parts will have primary jurisdiction over AOs 
charged with felony offenses and will be presided over by 
specially-trained family court judges,67 who will also hear cases 
of all thirteen- to fifteen-year-old Juvenile Offenders in these 
Parts.68  Pursuant to a newly implemented process of removal, 
all non-violent felonies allegedly committed by AOs are 
automatically transferred from the Youth Part to Family Court 
unless the defendant waives removal; or, the District Attorney 
may file a motion within thirty calendar days of the AO’s 
arraignment showing “extraordinary circumstances” that 
warrant retention of the matter in the Youth Part.69  Violent 
 
65.  Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6. 
66.  Id. The facilities for AOs have been developed by the state with 
enhanced security managed by the Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision with the assistance of the OCFS. Id.  
67.  Mumola, supra note 64, at 562 (citing Interview with Janet DiFiore, 
Chief Judge, N.Y. State (Mar. 16, 2018)) (“To make this transition smoother 
[for the Youth Parts], ‘there [were] extensive [state-wide] trainings held 
throughout the summer [of 2018] . . . on the new law.’ Additionally, judges and 
court staff engaged in a specialized training to better prepare them to address 
cases of adolescent and juvenile offenders.”); Yyvonne Borkowski et. al., Panel 
Discussion, Perspectives on the First Year of Implementation of Raise the Age, 
Westchester Women’s Bar Association CLE (Oct. 3, 2019) [hereinafter WWBA 
CLE] (“The statute requires that the Youth Court Judges receive specialized 
training in juvenile justice, adolescent development, custody and care of youths 
and effective treatment methods for reducing unlawful conduct by youths.”); 
see Our Statement on the Final Phase of State-Wide Implementation, Our 
Agenda for Achieving Youth Justice, RAISE THE AGE NY 1 (Oct. 1, 2019) 
[hereinafter Agenda for Achieving Youth Justice], 
https://raisetheageny.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RTANY-Statement-for-
10.1.2019.pdf (as of October 1, 2019, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds falling 
under the purview of the RTA law have their cases heard before a judge trained 
in “adolescent development and family law”).  
68.  Riviezzo, supra note 35, at 4; Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, 
at 7.  
69.  N.Y. CPL § 722.23(1)(a) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652) 
(“Following the arraignment of [an AO] charged with a crime . . . other than 
any class A felony except for those defined in article two hundred twenty of the 
penal law, a violent felony defined in section 70.02 of the penal law or a felony 
listed in paragraph one or two of subdivision forty-two of section 1.20 of this 
chapter, or an offense set forth in the vehicle and traffic law, the court shall 
order the removal of the action to the family court . . . unless, within thirty 
calendar days of such arraignment, the district attorney makes a motion to 
15
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felonies may also be transferred from the Youth Part to Family 
Court if the District Attorney timely files the same motion 
showing “extraordinary circumstances.”70  Although integral to 
the law and to the removal process it formed, the RTA legislation 
is wholly devoid of a definition of “extraordinary 
circumstances.”71  Yet, the RTA law specifies a three-part test 
which retains a violent felony juvenile matter in the Youth Part 
automatically if one or more is proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence72: if the defendant is found to have (1) displayed a 
deadly weapon in furtherance of the offense; (2) caused 
significant physical injury; or, (3) engaged in certain criminal 
sexual conduct.73  The term “significant physical injury” has not 
been defined by the Raise the Age legislation.74  These three 
factors may not necessarily constitute elements of an offense, but 
the language “set forth in the accusatory instrument” may 
require the People to allege so nonetheless.75  Upon the 
arraignment of an AO charged with a violent felony in the Youth 
Part, “the court shall schedule an appearance no later than six 
calendar days from such arraignment for the purpose of 
reviewing the accusatory instrument”76 and other relevant facts 
 
prevent removal of the action . . . .”); see also id. § 722.23(1)(d) (“[T]he court 
[shall] make[] a determination upon such motion by the district attorney [to 
prevent removal of the case] that extraordinary circumstances exist that 
should prevent the transfer of the action to family court.”); Riviezzo, supra note 
35, at 15. 
70.  Riviezzo, supra note 35, at 15. 
71.  Jesse McKinley, ‘Raise the Age,’ Now Law in New York, Is Still a 
Subject of Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/04/10/nyregion/raise-the-age-new-york.html; see CPL § 722.23. 
72.  E.g., People v. D.G., No. FYC-70228-19, 2019 WL 2455461, at *12 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. Apr. 4, 2019) (“In Pattern Jury Instructions, to 
establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that 
something is more likely true than not true.”); People v. M.M. (M.M. I), 97 
N.Y.S.3d 426, 428 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) (quoting 58A N.Y. JUR. 2D 
EVIDENCE & WITNESSES § 978 (2019)) (“The well-established preponderance of 
the evidence standard requires evidence that is sufficient to ‘produce a 
reasonable belief in the truth of the facts asserted.’”). 
73.  Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 15; Riviezzo, supra note 35, 
at 14. These matters will “likely [represent] the majority of cases.” Hager, 
supra note 49.  
74.  See CPL § 722.23(2)(b); infra Part II(a)(2). 
75.  CPL § 722.23 cmt. Vehicle and Traffic Law cases and Class A felonies 
other than Class A drug offenses cannot be transferred to family court. Id.; see 
RIVIEZZO, supra note 35, at 14. 
76.  CPL § 722.23 (2)(a).  
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to determine whether the People have proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence one or more of the foregoing 
three-part test.77  The RTA law does not specify the nature of the 
scope of the parties’ opportunity to be heard at the sixth-day 
appearance.78  If a court determines the action shall not proceed 
under CPL § 722.23(2) because none of the three factors are 
present, it lapses into processing under CPL § 722.23(1), under 
which removal to Family Court is available. 
 
 
 
The flow chart compiled by the Westchester Children’s 
Association below provides an illustrative representation of the 
procedural channels of the RTA law in New York’s criminal 
juvenile justice system:79 
 
77.  People v. E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d 743, 745 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019). 
This appearance is referred to by Nassau County courts as the “sixth-day 
appearance” and “sixth-day hearing” interchangeably. Id. In Bronx County, 
however, this appearance is referred to as a “retention hearing.” People v. N.C, 
110 N.Y.S.3d 833, 834 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019). Meanwhile, one Monroe 
County judge referred to it as “the six day review.” People v. Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d 
839, 840 (Cty. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2019). In Westchester County it is called the 
“RAI hearing.” WWBA CLE, supra note 68. See CPL § 722.23(2)(a). For the 
purposes of this Article, it will be referred to as “the sixth day hearing.” 
78.  E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 747; People v. B.H. (B.H. I), 89 N.Y.S.3d 855, 
860 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2018) (“[T]here is surprisingly little authority on 
what constitutes the opportunity to be heard.”); see CPL § 722.23(2)(a); infra 
note 111. 
79.  Raise the Age Flow Chart, WESTCHESTER CHILD. ASS’N, 
https://wca4kids.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Updated-Flow-Chart-1.png 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2019); see also Raise the Age: 6 Months In, WESTCHESTER 
CHILD. ASS’N (May 14, 2019), https://wca4kids.org/issues/raise-the-age/. 
17
472 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The Raise the Age Law’s Sealing Provision 
 
The RTA legislation also provides that individuals 
previously convicted of up to two statutorily defined “eligible 
offenses” in an adult court, but not more than one felony offense, 
may apply to the court in which the defendant was convicted to 
have their criminal record sealed after ten years from the 
imposition of the sentence or discharge from incarceration, 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9
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whichever is later.80  In considering any application, the court 
will consider a myriad of factors, including, but not limited to: 
the amount of time that has elapsed since the defendant’s last 
conviction, the circumstances and seriousness of the offense, the 
circumstances and seriousness of any other offenses the 
defendant was convicted of, the character of the defendant, 
including measures (s)he has taken toward rehabilitation or 
participating in community service programs, statements made 
by the victim of the offense, the impact that sealing will have on 
the defendant’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society, 
and the impact on public safety and the public’s confidence in 
the law.81  For offenses falling outside the “eligible offenses” 
designation, sealing is not available no matter how much time 
has passed since the defendant committed the crime, and 
regardless of how compelling a case the applicant can make for 
sealing his or her record.82 
The Legislature’s inclusion of the sealing provision in the 
RTA law speaks to the importance it places upon the impact 
criminal records can have on juvenile offenders who, upon 
reentering society, are likely to face seemingly insurmountable 
obligations of securing employment, housing, and education, to 
name a few, with the stain of a criminal record obtained before 
reaching adulthood.83  Moreover, the sealing provision found in 
the RTA law seeks to make a reality that which is currently a 
common misconception about juvenile records: they should be  
 
80.  See CPL § 160.59; 36A GEORGE L. BLUM & MARK GROMIS, CARMODY-
WAIT NEW YORK PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 208:30 (2d ed. 2018); Riviezzo, supra 
note 35; see also N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Court Help: Sealed Criminal 
Records, NYCOURTS.GOV, https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/ 
Criminal/sealedRecords.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Unlike some other 
states, New York has no laws to erase or ‘expunge’ criminal records. New York 
uses a process called sealing for some cases. Sealing means that the record still 
exists, but all related fingerprint and palmprint cards, booking photos, and 
DNA samples may be returned to you or destroyed (except digital fingerprints 
are not destroyed if you already have fingerprints on file from a different 
unsealed case).”). 
81.  CPL § 160.59. 
82.  People v. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d 594, 597 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2018). 
83.  Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO. L.J. 365, 368 (2018). 
Further, juvenile records can make it more difficult, if not impossible, for 
convicted adolescents to serve in the military, receive financial aid, or be 
granted a state occupational license. Id. They can also trigger immigration 
consequences, which in today’s political climate, may result in deportation or 
a denial of citizenship. Id. at 388. 
19
474 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.1 
confidential (after some point in time), ultimately sealed or 
expunged “because the juvenile justice system aims to 
rehabilitate rather than merely punish youth.”84  In today’s 
world of widespread access to information technology, the 
humanitarian goals of progressive juvenile justice fail to shield 
adolescents when they are completing applications for 
employment or school and are asked to reveal that they have a 
criminal record.85  For example, one study of sixty campuses of 
the State University of New York showed that almost two-thirds 
of the students who started to fill out the online Common 
Application for college failed to complete and submit the 
application if they answered affirmatively to question(s) about 
juvenile records.86  Furthermore, employment discrimination 
against ex-offenders, in general, is so pervasive that “any 
sentence is effectively a life sentence they must continue serving 
after their debt to society has been paid.”87  This damaging effect 
is especially damning for juvenile offenders because adolescents 
will likely lack a high level of education and an established 
employment record, placing them at a severe disadvantage 
against other applicants as their qualifications will fail to 
outweigh potential employers’ fears of liability for hiring 
negligently.88 
Due to the dramatic impact the RTA law will have on the 
courts, because cases that would have been adjudicated in 
criminal court (prior to the law’s passage) will now be removed 
to family court, this note will focus on the portions of the RTA 
law relative to the new class of “Adolescent Offenders” and the 
sealing provision.  Recent decisions from the courts have 
progressively shed light on the fissures left by the legislation, 
resulting in challenges for those falling under the purview of the 
RTA’s provisions, as well as those charged with administering 
it. 
 
IV. The First Phase of Implementation of the Raise the Age 
Legislation for New York’s Sixteen-Year-Old Adolescent 
 
84.  Id. at 369. 
85.  See generally id. 
86.  Id. at 387. 
87.  Judith G. McMullen, Invisible Stripes: The Problem of Youth 
Criminal Records, 27 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 19 (2018). 
88.  Id. at 19-20. 
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Offenders & Past Offenders Seeking to Seal Criminal 
Convictions 
 
As courts across New York state contend with the recently 
implemented provisions of the RTA law, pitfalls of the legislation 
have become apparent, especially with regard to provisions for 
the removal and sealing of criminal records processes.89  The 
obstacles arising from the vagueness of the legislation’s sealing 
and removal provisions have at times obfuscated the progressive 
intentions behind the RTA legislation; however, this has been 
somewhat alleviated by growing case law defining the nuances 
of the statute and calling attention to areas of the law apt for 
improvement. 
 
A. Sealing Provision: Adjudications Inconsistent with the 
Rehabilitative Spirit of Raise the Age Expose 
Legislation’s Defects 
 
The sealing provision, Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) 
§ 160.59, was enacted in October 2017 and provides a 
mechanism for defendants to move to seal up to two “eligible 
offenses,” as explained above.90  At the time of its enactment, 
Governor Cuomo declared the ameliorative purpose of the 
statute as an “eliminat[ion of] unnecessary barriers to 
opportunity and employment that former[ly] incarcerated 
individuals face and to improve the fairness of the state’s 
criminal justice system.91  Accordingly, New York’s Executive 
Law was amended to make it an unlawful discriminatory 
 
89.  This section of this Article is derived from reported decisions available 
on online legal research services, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis and is 
written cognizant of the fact that the reported cases reflect only a fraction of 
decisions on sealing applications and AO matters processed through criminal 
and family courts, respectively, pursuant to the RTA legislation. The judicial 
opinions discussed herein are intended to showcase unique issues in growing 
case law from courts administering the RTA law in its first year of 
implementation.  
90.  CPL section 160.59(1)(a) delineates offenses that are not considered 
“eligible offenses,” including, but not limited to, certain sex offense[s], violent 
felony offense(s), including felonious homicide, a Class A felony, an attempt to 
commit an offense that is not an eligible offense if the attempt is a felony, or 
an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required, etc. N.Y. CPL 
§ 160.59 (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652). 
91.  People v. John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d 853, 855 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2018).  
21
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practice “to make inquiry about, whether in any form of 
application or otherwise, or to act upon adversely to the 
individual involved, any arrest or criminal accusation” that 
resulted in a conviction and was subsequently sealed.92  
However, in practice, CPL § 160.59 has produced adjudications 
inconsistent with the stated purpose and the language of the 
statute itself. 
Motions under CPL § 160.59 by individuals who were 
criminally convicted decades ago, and who went on to lead law-
abiding lives thereafter, were nonetheless barred from sealing 
their criminal records; giving courts the opportunity to remedy 
the inadequacies of the statute in its present form.  While some 
courts have determined sealing motions with a focus on applying 
the laudable intent of the statute, others have focused on the 
convictions themselves, with neither approach giving enough 
substantial value to the argument that if the movant was subject 
to the current RTA legislation at the time of his/her conviction, 
(s)he may have been afforded sealing of his or her criminal 
records without obstacle. 
In Jaime S., the court granted the movant’s motion seeking 
to seal the record of his convictions of numerous computer 
crimes93 despite the movant falling outside the class of offenders 
intended to benefit from the sealing statute, because it would 
make little sense to deny him relief “until such time as his life 
takes a turn for the worse” when he was applying for higher 
employment at the time of filing.94  The Jaime S. court’s 
auspicious approach to this case indicates that courts applying 
similar logic may interpret the RTA’s sealing law based on the 
impact it will have on the individual’s ability to become a 
 
92.  Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16) 
(LexisNexis 2019)). 
93.  Jaime S. pled guilty to two Class E felonies in connection with his 
illicit actions while working in the IT department of a law firm between 1997 
and 2002, for which he was sentenced to a five-year probationary term, which 
the Court terminated over a year early, and was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. 
People v. Jaime S., 70 N.Y.S.3d 794, 797-98 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2018). 
94.  Id. at 795. Although Jaime S. is “skilled and experienced in his field,” 
when his employer’s company was bought out by a larger entity, the entity 
rescinded its offer of employment to Jaime S. after conducting a background 
check. Jamie alleged that in the fifteen years since his conviction, 
approximately fifteen other job interviews had unsuccessful results, leading 
him to exhaust unemployment insurance benefits and his life savings, and 
causing him to become depressed and anxious. Id. at 797. 
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successful member of, and contribute to, society instead of 
adhering to the exact letter of the law, which would have 
otherwise barred sealing in Jamie S.’ particular case and future 
cases of others similarly situated.95  Nonetheless, other courts 
determining sealing motions have felt constrained by the narrow 
parameters of the RTA law regarding the eligibility of 
convictions for sealing under the statute. 
The case of John Doe showcased a movant’s attempt to 
capitalize on the vagueness in the statute regarding when 
multiple felony convictions can be treated as a single conviction, 
which may allow for such convictions to be deemed eligible for 
sealing under the quantitative prong of the statute, which only 
allows for sealing of up to two offenses.96  The movant argued 
that two of his criminal convictions should have been treated as 
one for sealing, since they were run concurrently.  However, the 
Court rejected this contention since his criminal activities were 
not “so closely related and connected in point of time and 
circumstances as to constitute a single criminal incident.”97  
Hence, under the current RTA legislation, individuals who were 
convicted of more than two crimes that are considered distinct 
criminal acts will not be able to consolidate the supernumerary 
convictions to seal their criminal record, even if the crimes were 
temporally proximate to each other.98  Yet, New York’s laws 
currently entitle defendants who were drug addicted, accepted 
 
95.  See CPL § 160.59(7)(f). But see People v. Timothy S., No. 1086-05, 
2018 NYLJ LEXIS 2400 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. July 9, 2018) (granting sealing 
for a movant that fell squarely under the CPL § 160.59 sealing provision, since 
his conviction of the Class E felony of promoting gambling in the first degree 
is an eligible non-violent offense under the statute, occurred in 2005, and 
Timothy S. had no subsequent criminal arrests or convictions). 
96.  John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 853-54. John Doe was a defendant arrested 
twice in the span of a month and a half in 1985 for selling cocaine to undercover 
police officers when he was nineteen years old. Id. He resolved both cases by 
pleading guilty to two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the 
third degree, a class B felony, and one count of criminal facilitation in the 
fourth degree. Id. Since his convictions, he worked in the New York City 
Department of Sanitation for over two decades, became an active member of 
his church and participated in community service, and had no contact with the 
criminal justice system for over thirty years. Id. at 853-56. 
97.  John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 854-56. 
98.  See id. (holding that two felonious criminal sales of cocaine within one 
and a half months did not occur sufficiently contemporaneously to deem the 
acts one criminal incident, and thus disqualified the movant’s criminal record 
for sealing).  
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into, and completed judicial diversion programs to sealing of up 
to three misdemeanor drug offenses.99  This disparity in the RTA 
law’s allocation of eligibility under the sealing provision for non-
violent drug-related offenses will likely have to be addressed by 
the Legislature in order to “further advance the statute’s 
[explicit] laudable goals,”100 especially since it can likely be 
addressed “without having a deleterious effect on public safety 
or society’s respect for the law.”101 
The RTA legislation’s sealing provision also fails to account 
for juvenile offenders who would have received AO treatment 
under the newly defined criterion for sixteen- and seventeen-
year-old offenders had RTA been in place when they were 
convicted.102  The Court in People v. Jane Doe was “constrain[ed] 
to deny [her sealing] motion” since her conviction for second 
degree robbery is considered a violent felony offense, and 
therefore not an offense eligible for sealing.103  However, this 
ruling defies the logic that if Jane Doe, or other movants like her 
were granted the Youthful Offender status she was eligible for 
at the time of her conviction, she would be eligible for sealing 
today, much like a similarly situated sixteen-year-old AO under 
the RTA law would be treated.104  The inequity apparent in the 
 
99.  Id. at 856-58 (noting that defendants whose cases predate the 
widespread use of judicial diversion programs, but have nevertheless 
demonstrably extricated themselves from any involvement with drugs are 
entitled to significantly less relief). The court discussed the notion that drug 
dealers and drug addicts “are often the same people,” who, as a result of their 
addiction, often accumulate multiple criminal convictions. Id. at 856 (citing 
Kathy Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is Also a Crackdown on Drug 
Users, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/a-crackdown-on-drug-dealers-is-also-a-crackdown-on-drug-users/). 
100.  John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 857. 
101.  Id. at 858-59. 
102. Zhandarka Kurti & William Martin, Cuomo’s “Carceral Humanism,” 
JACOBIN (Nov. 16, 2018), https://jacobinmag.com/2018/11/andrew-cuomo-
juvenile-justice-carceral-humanism-kalief-browder (“Most sixteen- and 
seventeen-year[-]olds will still bear the scarlet letter of an adult criminal 
record. According to the Division of Criminal Justice Services, 3,063 sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-olds were charged in 2017 with violent felonies that the 
new law’s passage would not affect.”). See N.Y. CPL § 722.23 (McKinney 
through L.2019 ch. 652). 
103.  People v. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d 594, 594 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 
2018). 
104.  See id. In 1984, Jane Doe was arrested and charged with one count 
of robbery in the second degree in connection with a robbery that allegedly had 
occurred at Queens County High School where the defendant twisted the 
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sealing statute will likely be addressed by future revisions to the 
RTA legislation, as discussed in Part IV(i) infra. 
 
B. Unfolding Case Law Is Filling the Void Left by 
Lawmakers to Define Vague Terminology in Removal 
Provisions 
 
As explained in Part II(i) supra, under the recently enacted 
RTA legislation, sixteen-year-old AOs charged with violent 
and/or non-violent felonies begin in the Youth Part of New York’s 
criminal courts105; however, there are distinct procedures 
employed in accordance with the degree of the crime(s) lodged 
against the defendant.106  Since the District Attorney must cite 
“extraordinary circumstances” in a motion in order to retain 
nonviolent felonies in the Youth Part according to CPL 
§ 722.23(1), courts have had to determine such motions of first-
impression while simultaneously navigating the murky waters 
of the RTA law itself, which lacks any definition of extraordinary 
circumstances.107  The interstices of the removal procedure in 
the RTA legislation has similarly challenged courts determining 
whether to remove AOs charged with violent felonies to family 
court under CPL § 722.23(2).  Although the three-factor test108 
appears to be clear on its face, the RTA legislation is devoid of 
any definition of “significant physical injury”109 or “display[ing] 
a [weapon],”110 and does not delineate the scope of the 
mandatory hearing scheduled for six days after the AO’s 
 
complainant’s arm while the other perpetrators took her pocketbook and 
unicorn charm. Id. at 595. When defendant pleaded guilty to one charge of 
attempted robbery in the second degree, the sentencing court denied her 
youthful offender treatment and sentenced her to five years’ probation, which 
was terminated one year early at the request of the Department of Probation. 
Id. Jane Doe moved to seal her juvenile conviction record following her 
application for a job which required a criminal background check. Id. 
105.  As of this writing, the second phase of the RTA has been 
implemented and as such, New York’s seventeen-year-olds will be subject to 
the same procedure in place for sixteen-year-olds. 
106.  See CPL § 722.23. 
107.  See id. §§ 722.23(1)(a), (1)(c); supra Part II(i).  
108.  The three-factor test requires the state prove that the AO (i) caused 
significant physical injury; or (ii) displayed a deadly weapon in furtherance of 
the offense; or (iii) engaged in certain criminal sexual conduct.  CPL 
§ 722.23(2); see supra Part II(i). 
109.  See CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(i). 
110.  See id. § 722.23(2)(c)(ii). 
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arraignment on a violent felony charge(s), during which the 
court disposes of the matter based upon whether the State has 
proved any of the three factors by a preponderance of the 
evidence.111  Where the action does not proceed under CPL 
§ 722.23(2), it reverts to processing under CPL § 722.23(1) and 
the case becomes subject to the vague terminology there, i.e. 
“extraordinary circumstances.”112 
Courts have faced complex determinations contending with 
the RTA’s resounding silence in defining “extraordinary 
circumstances,”113 “significant physical injury,”114 and/or 
“displayed.”115  Via their broad discretion in deciding statutory 
interpretation methodology, courts have turned to the plain 
meaning of the words themselves; existing case law; legislative 
records (elucidating the Legislature’s intent and the overall goal 
 
111.  One court has found that “the closest analogy [to the sixth day 
hearing] is the opportunity to be heard on issuance of a temporary order of 
protection (‘TOP’). The key difference [being] that while a TOP hearing, 
whether evidentiary or otherwise, is purely in the Court’s discretion, [the sixth 
day hearing] is mandatory. In any event, the initial opportunity to be heard on 
the question of removal is similar to a TOP hearing in that ‘both accusatory 
instruments and supporting depositions may be considered’ and, as with most 
pretrial hearings, hearsay evidence may be admitted.” B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 
860. See CPL §§ 722.23(2)(a)-(c); People v. L.M., No. IND-00000-00/000, 2019 
WL 1187308, at *4 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. Mar. 12, 2019) (“[B]ecause the 
statute states that the purpose of the sixth-day appearance is for the Court’s 
review of the ‘accusatory instrument,’ there is no basis to find that the nature 
of the proceeding differs pre- and post-indictment.”); see also People v. Y.L., 
104 N.Y.S.3d 839, 840 (Cty. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2019) (court considered People’s 
exhibits attached to its affirmation, including detective’s written narratives of 
separate interviews of AOs and “Facebook Live” video, to have sufficient 
evidentiary foundation and to be “relevant, material, and fairly considered.”). 
112.  See CPL §§ 722.23(2)(c)-(d); supra Part II(i). 
113.  CPL § 722.23(1)(d) (“The court shall deny the motion to prevent 
removal of the action in youth part unless the court makes a determination 
upon such motion by the district attorney that extraordinary circumstances 
exist that should prevent the transfer of the action to family court.”). 
114.  CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(i) (“The court shall order the action to proceed in 
accordance with subdivision one of this section unless . . . the court determines 
that the district attorney proved by a preponderance of the evidence . . . (i) the 
defendant caused significant physical injury to a person other than a 
participant in the offense . . . .”). 
115.  In the context of whether the AO “displayed” a weapon in 
furtherance of the charged offense. See CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii) (“The court shall 
order the action to proceed in accordance with subdivision one of this section 
unless . . . the court determines that the district attorney proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . (ii) the defendant displayed a firearm, 
shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon as defined in the penal law in furtherance of 
such offense . . . .”). 
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of the legislation in interpreting the terms);116 as well as  other 
various  sections of New York Penal Law (further illuminating 
the judicial search for definitional meaning of vague terminology 
used in the RTA law) on a case-by-case basis.117 
 
a. What are Extraordinary Circumstances in Adolescent 
Offender Matters under  N.Y. CPL  § 722.23(1)? 
 
The Legislature specifically contemplated that courts would 
“shape and determine” the meaning of extraordinary 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis while maintaining a “very 
high bar” for retention of cases in the Youth Part.118  The New 
York Court of Appeals has provided courts with a foundational 
concept to define extraordinary circumstances: “Absent a 
statutory definition [the court] must give the term its ordinary 
 
116.  People v. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d 731, 739 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019) (“In 
pursuit of a determination of the ‘meaning intended by the lawmakers’ 
McKinney’s Statutes section 125 provides, in pertinent part, ‘If the 
interpretation to be attached to a statute is doubtful, the courts may utilize 
legislative proceedings to ascertain the legislative intent.’”).  
117.  See People v. E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d 743, 745 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 
2019); B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d 855, 860 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2018).  
118.  People v. B.H. (B.H. II), 92 N.Y.S.3d 856, 859-60 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
Cty. 2019) (quoting N.Y. State Assemb. Rec. of Proceedings, Apr. 8, 2017, at  
83-85 [hereinafter Assemb. Proceedings], https://nyassembly.gov/ 
raisetheage/transcripts/full-debate.pdf); see also E.B.M., 95 N.YS.3d at 745 
(quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra, at 21) (“[L]egislators intended that the 
requirement of finding one of three factors would ensure that ‘only those cases 
[of] the truly violent felons would stay in the criminal part, and those kids who 
were not violent would be able to find their way to family court, where they not 
only could get superior services, but would be able to get better outcomes for 
their lives not only with the services that were employed, but by not receiving 
a criminal record at the end of all this so that they could change their life 
around.’”); People v. J.B., 94 N.Y.S. 3d 826, 829 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. 
2019) (citing CPL § 722.23(1)(d)) (“[T]he court must deny the motion unless it 
finds that ‘extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer 
of the action to family court.’”); People v. M.M. (M.M. II), 99 N.Y.S.3d 858, 866, 
868 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra, at 37-
38) (“[T]he question is whether the People have proved that the circumstances 
in th[e] AO’s case are so exceptional and beyond what is ‘usual’ to overcome the 
‘presumption where only one out of 1,000 cases those extremely rare and 
exceptional cases’ would remain in the Youth Part and not be removed to the 
Family Court”); People v. D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d 866, 869 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Cty. 
2018) (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra, at 39) (“Transfer to the family 
court should be denied only when highly unusual and heinous facts are proven 
and there is a strong proof that the young person is not amenable or would not 
benefit in any way from the heightened services in the family court.”). 
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and commonly understood meaning. . . . unless it is plain from 
the statue that a different meaning is intended”119; however, 
although “‘[d]ictionary definitions may be useful as guideposts 
in determining the sense with which a word was used in a 
statute . . . they are not controlling.’”120  Hence, the dictionary 
definition of extraordinary, “exceptional to a very marked 
extent,”121 or “[a] highly unusual set of facts that are not 
commonly associated with a particular thing or event”122 is 
merely one of many components defining “extraordinary 
circumstances” in the court system.123  In addition, New York 
Assembly discussions concerning the vague definition of 
extraordinary circumstances contemplated several aggravating 
factors that a court may consider when determining whether 
extraordinary circumstances are present, including 
 
(1) whether the AO had committed a series of 
crimes over many days; 
(2) whether the AO had acted in an especially 
cruel and/or heinous manner; and 
(3) whether the AO was a leader of the criminal 
activity who had threatened or coerced other 
reluctant youths into committing the crimes 
before the court.124 
 
119.  J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 738 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
120.  Id.; People v. T.R., No. FYC-70017-18/001, 2018 WL 7361428, at *2 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. Dec. 21, 2018) (“We can conclude from its ordinary 
meaning that it refers to that which is ‘very unusual’ or ‘remarkable.’ The 
Court, in its discretion, should look for circumstances that go beyond what is 
regular and foreseeable in the normal course of events.”). 
121.  M.M. II, 99 N.Y.S.3d at 864 (citing Extraordinary, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extraordinary (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019)). 
122.  J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 739 (citing Extraordinary, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
123.  Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2009)). 
124.  B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d 856, 859-60 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) 
(quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at 40); see People v. A.G., No-
FYC-XXXXX-18-001, 2018 WL 7120259, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Dec. 
20, 2018) (holding that the AO’s several offenses involving robbery and grand 
larceny allegedly committed while on Family Court Probation, in addition to 
the AO’s numerous pending cases, constituted an extraordinary circumstance 
that would warrant retention of the matter in the Youth Part and “provide a 
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The Assembly also set forth a relatively comprehensive list 
of mitigating factors, which include 
 
economic difficulties faced by the AO, 
substandard housing the AO may havelived in, 
educational challenges experienced by the AO; 
and emotional/psychological difficulties the AO 
may have, such as lack of insight, susceptibility to 
peer pressure due to immature [sic], the absence 
of positive role models or positive behavioral role 
models in the AO’s life, and abuse of alcohol or 
drugs.125 
The significance of both the aggravating and mitigating 
factors is their satisfaction of the “circumstances” portion of the 
extraordinary circumstances term, and, pragmatically, the 
“context they provide for evaluating the criminal conduct 
committed by the defendant . . . .”126  In addition to the above 
mitigating factors, courts have explicitly considered adolescents’ 
inability to adequately foresee and take responsibility for the 
 
consistent outcome for defendant’s potential rehabilitation”). But see People v. 
D.P., No. FYC-70001-19, 2019 WL 1120491, at *5 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. Feb. 
22, 2019) (distinguishing A.G. on the facts because the AO in D.P. did not have 
any pending matters before the Court, and granting removal to family court). 
As for the third prong, one court has opined that “conspiring with [two] other 
children is hardly extraordinary.” T.R., 2018 WL 7361428, at *2. 
125.  B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 856; see J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 734-43 
(discussing the AO’s extensive history with Child Protective Services and the 
failed efforts of various social workers over time to intervene with the 
defendant’s family dynamic in a constructive way, which were typically 
thwarted by defendant’s mother, from 2010 through 2018). J.P.’s mother was 
his most significant adult family member in his life, but she had neglected, 
rejected, and given up on him. Id. at 736. Despite this, the defendant presented 
two character witnesses to testify in his favor and class certificates he earned 
for class work and other activities while incarcerated since December 2018. Id. 
The Court ultimately held that the case should be transferred to family court 
since his “home life . . . constitute[d] a substantial contributing factor to this 
now sixteen-year-old defendant’s recidivism. As such, it must be viewed as a 
mitigating circumstance within the meaning of extraordinary 
circumstances . . . .” Id. at 743. 
126.  Id. at 735; see B.H. II, 921 N.Y.S.3d at 860 (“The Court is persuaded 
that a balancing of the factors set forth by the Legislature is the proper manner 
in which to determine if extraordinary circumstances exist in a given AO 
case.”). 
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legal consequences of their actions.127  The inherent dichotomy 
between an AOs’ inability to make choices with legal impact in 
their day-to-day lives and the prosecution of AOs in the Youth 
Part of adult criminal court has been highlighted by judicial 
recognition of AOs’ statuses as “legal minor[s] for virtually all 
purposes under New York law [who cannot] vote, sign a binding 
contract, commence a lawsuit, select [their] own domicile or 
legally purchase alcohol or tobacco products” when determining 
whether extraordinary circumstances are present.128  To that 
end, courts have also considered the punishment(s) associated 
with the allegation(s) lodged against an AO as a factor of 
extraordinary circumstances, in the interest of aligning an AO’s 
sentence with his or her actual level of culpability and capacity 
to change, which is unquestionably tied to age.129 
 
127.  See People v. D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d 866, 871 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Cty. 
2018). In holding that the AO matter should be removed to family court, where 
it was alleged the AO was intentionally set a piece of furniture on fire on the 
complainant’s porch, the court reasoned that the AO’s “behavior is precisely 
the type of impulsive act done without thought of consequences, which is 
typical of young people. Had D.L. truly intended to burn the house and harm 
the inhabitants, a fire could have been set at night or in a manner where no 
one was aware of her actions. Instead, D.L. rang the complainant’s door bell 
and announced her plan to set a fire because she was mad, thereby allowing 
the adult occupant to take action to curb her behavior.” Id.; see also T.R., 2018 
WL 7361428, at *1-3 (finding that an AO’s failure to accept responsibility or 
“throw himself at the mercy of the investigating officers with an expansive and 
total mea culpa” for allegedly writing and delivering a note to school 
administrators that read, “I’m going to bomb this school today at 12 [dated] 
11/13/2018,” was “hardly irregular or unforeseeable” and that it was “very 
common that a sixteen-year-old child would fabricate a story or distance 
himself from involvement in a circumstance such as this”). 
128.  D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d at 870-71. 
129.  Id. at 871 (discussing the matter of an AO charged with Attempted 
Arson in the Second Degree, whose matter was removed to family court 
because, among other factors, “[i]f the crime occurred just three weeks earlier, 
the case would have automatically gone to Family Court . . . [and] [s]ince the 
crime is not a juvenile offender offense . . . D.L. would not have been criminally 
responsible for her actions and there would have been no legal possibility of 
criminal prosecution”). The court there also reasoned that “[i]t [was] also 
relevant to consider that if D.L.’s case remain[ed] in the Youth Part it [would 
have been] adjudicated under the criminal law, which mandates incarceration 
in the NYS Department of Corrections.” Id. The court in J.P. attributes this 
portion of the court’s discussion in D.L. to the “growing acknowledgment in the 
judicial branch as well as in the legislature, over time, that ‘children are less 
culpable in the criminal context than adults and more amenable to change,’” 
which is also comparable to the tenor of other judicial opinions discussing AO 
removal matters. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at n.5. See also B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 857 
(“In Family Court, young defendants would have better access to youth focused 
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As evidenced by emerging decisions disposing of motions 
seeking retention of AO matters in the Youth Part of adult 
criminal court, judges appear to have widened the guideposts 
laid by the Legislature to discern extraordinary circumstances 
by weighing all of the circumstances relevant to the offense(s), 
the offender, and the impact removal may have on the 
community on a case-by-case basis.130  Furthermore, because the 
ostensibly accepted “totality of the circumstances” approach 
among New York’s courts disposing of removal motions comports 
with the purpose and focus of the RTA law itself, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that this approach will permeate the 
courts’ decisions into the second phase of the RTA’s 
implementation.  However, considering the broad discretion 
afforded to presiding judges, unbridled by controlling authority 
outside of the RTA statute that is exactly on point as to 
Adolescent Offender matters thereunder, “invariably and 
necessarily, weight to be given relevant factors will vary in each 
individual case that comes before the Youth Part and individual 
determinations will result in conclusions upon which reasonable 
people may disagree.”131 
 
services and treatment and would be saved the onus of a criminal conviction, 
but would still be subject to appropriate sanctions to hold them accountable.”); 
id. at 861 (“[T]here is no evidence in the records showing that the AO is not 
amenable to services”); D.P., 2019 WL 1120491, at *3 (rejecting the People’s 
argument that removal to family court would “merely amount to allowing 
Defendant’s criminal behavior to go without consequences,” since a parole 
revocation hearing and removal to family court could lead to placement, in 
addition to a likely juvenile delinquency charge in family court). 
130.  See B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 861 (“[A] balancing of the factors set forth 
by the Legislature is the proper manner in which to determine if extraordinary 
circumstances exist in a given AO case.”); J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 742 (“In applying 
that definition to the extraordinary circumstances standard . . . the scope of 
discretion vested in the trial court Youth Part by the legislature bears 
noting. . . . [T]he pertinent sections of Criminal Procedure Law Article [§] 722 
do not limit an adolescent offender’s eligibility for removal based on prior 
juvenile delinquency adjudications, youthful offender adjudications, or even 
prior criminal convictions, including for that matter, prior felony convictions.”); 
T.R., 2018 WL 7361428, at *3 (“While it may be that Defendant’s conduct 
affected thousands of innocent lives by placing them in fear and causing them 
emotional harm which could perhaps be considered extraordinary 
circumstances, it would be mere speculation as the Court does not have fact to 
conclude that this is actually the case that rises to the level of extraordinary 
circumstances.”); see also, e.g., D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d 866; D.P., 2019 WL 1120491; 
A.G., 2018 WL 7120259. 
131.  J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 742; see J.B., 94 N.Y.S.3d at 829 (holding that 
while the court “decidedly acknowledge[d] the violent nature of [the] crime and 
31
486 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.1 
The case of R.M. may represent such a controversial 
decision.132  There, while the court acknowledged the emotional 
and violent nature of the AO’s crime, which involved the 
suffocation and disembowelment of a cat, it opined that it was 
“constrained by the language of the statute and the philosophy 
behind it in determining the facts and circumstances . . . [did] 
not rise to the level of ‘extraordinary circumstances’” to warrant 
retention in the Youth Part.133  The court conceded that R.M.’s 
actions amounted to the “especially depraved or sadistic 
manner” contemplated by the aggravated cruelty statute under 
which she was charged, yet appeared to take a subjective 
approach in assessing whether extraordinary circumstances 
existed.134  To that end, it explicitly considered two “major” 
factors: “the nature of the criminal behavior and the defendant’s 
mental health status.”135  However, the court appeared to 
displace the significance of the former factor altogether by 
reasoning that “without the ‘especially depraved or sadistic 
manner’ of [the] crime, and the fact that the deceased cat was a 
companion animal, the underlying facts would establish the 
elements of . . . a class ‘A’ misdemeanor.”136  Thus, it effectively 
overlooked a clear aggravating factor prescribed to determine 
extraordinary circumstances, i.e. the heinous nature of the act, 
in favor of the mitigating factor of the defendant’s mental health.  
Furthermore, although it reasonably concluded that 
 
the potential impact of the defendant’s alleged conduct on the community as a 
whole,” i.e. that the AO was in possession of and discarded a firearm into a 
garbage can while fleeing from police, it was bound to order the matter be 
removed to Family Court). 
132.  People v. R.M., 94 N.Y.S.3d 764 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Dec. 14, 
2018). 
133.  R.M., 94 N.Y.S.3d at 769. The cat the AO suffocated belonged to a 
family friend with whom the defendant was sent to live. Id. at 765. After slicing 
the cat open and removing its small and large intestines, pancreas, and spleen, 
the AO kept them in a container in her room. Id. 
134.  Id.  (“Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a(1) defines ‘aggravated 
cruelty’ as conduct that ‘(i) is intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is 
done or carried out in an especially depraved or sadistic manner.’”). 
135.  Id. R.M.’s mental illnesses resulted in several suicide attempts and 
hospitalizations. Despite this, she attended regular classes and maintained an 
average in the nineties. R.M. had also, at least once, “impulsively choked and 
attempted to strangulate [sic] her sister, which prompted her stay with the 
family friend in question.” Id. at 766-67.  
136.  Id. at 769 (“The court is of the opinion that the mental health of the 
defendant weighs in favor of transferring the case to Family Court, not against 
it.”). 
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“incarceration [was] not fitting for this defendant, but rather a 
therapeutic, albeit secure, setting [was]”137 based on the AO’s 
mental health history, the court simultaneously admitted that 
both Family Court and the Youth Parts are capable of finding 
placement for the AO through probation services.138  In light of 
the court’s acquiescence that the AO’s acts were sadistic and the 
AO could be placed in an appropriate facility by either court, the 
denial of the district attorney’s motion, and the subsequent 
removal of the matter to Family Court, appears to reflect the 
growing expectation that judges will heed their own discretion 
in discerning extraordinary circumstances concomitant with the 
overall spirit of the RTA law.139 
Furthermore, as to the comprehensive factors courts are 
weighing in removal motions, there is a growing body of 
divergent opinions on the issue of whether an AO’s past and/or 
current involvement with the criminal justice system is 
pertinent to an extraordinary circumstances determination, 
even if such facts are outside of the accusatory instrument.140  
Generally, where the offense before the Youth Part marks the 
AO’s first brush with the criminal justice system, i.e. is his or 
her “first offense,” courts have deemed that fact a mitigating 
factor and used it to underscore the appropriateness of removal 
to Family Court in the spirit of the RTA.141  To that end, that 
 
137. Id. 
138. Id. (“[T]he adult setting is no more adept at finding the appropriate 
placement for the adolescent and monitoring [their] progress and treatment, 
two tasks that probation, available equally to Family Court as the Youth Part, 
will be vital in achieving.”). 
139.  Cf. B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 860-61 (granting removal of an AO matter 
to family court since the Court’s balancing of factors concluded there was no 
evidence tending to show aggravating circumstances nor evidence that the AO 
was the one who actually stabbed the most seriously injured victim, and there 
were sufficient mitigating circumstances enumerated by the Legislature and 
no evidence that the AO is not amenable to services). 
140.  See infra notes 141-44. 
141.  People v. A.T. (A.T. II), 98 N.Y.S.3d 377, 380 (Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. 
2019) (“[T]he Court agrees with Counsel’s interpretation of the legislative 
intent to remove children and to rehabilitate those who are amenable to 
services . . . .”); see People v. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d 731, 739 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 
2019) (removed to family court); People v. L.L., FYC-700**-10-001, 2019 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 4277, at *13-14 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. July 19, 2019) (“The 
behavior alleged here demonstrates the kind of poor judgment and impetuous 
conduct that militates in favor of removal to the family court in order to 
redirect defendant’s errant path. Moreover, since this is defendant’s first 
contact with the criminal justice system, this Court does not believe that 
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factor has served as an indicator of the AO’s amenability to the 
services available in Family Court and a lack of “extraordinary 
circumstances,” leading to an order of removal.142 Likewise, 
whether an AO has pending matters before the court, or has a 
criminal history has been weighed by courts determining 
removal actions.  In line with the “first offense” approach, when 
an AO has no pending cases apart from the instant adjudication, 
courts have found no extraordinary circumstances to exist and 
have ordered removal of the case to family court.143  The opposite 
has also proven true in that where an AO has multiple pending 
cases before the Youth Part or similar courts, and appears 
unamenable to services, the “extraordinary circumstances” 
requirement has been met and retention in the Youth Part 
ordered.144 
However, at the time of this writing one court has declined 
 
defendant presents a danger to public safety such that removal should be 
denied. Rather, this matter can be effectively adjudicated in the family court 
where either rehabilitation and/or detention can be imposed.”).  
142.  People v. J.W., No. FYC-70022-19, 2019 WL 1576074, at *2 (Fam. 
Ct. Erie Cty. Mar. 28, 2019) (“Since arraignment AO has been amenable to 
services. . . . [After] AO was released on own recognizance[,] AO has timely 
appeared in court for all further proceedings. AO has led a law-abiding life. AO 
has attended school as directed.”). Notably, J.W. was A.T.’s co-defendant in 
A.T. II, and the key difference between the dispositions of their matters 
evidently lied in the court’s judgment of each AO’s amenability to services. Cf. 
D.P., No. FYC-70001-19, 2019 WL 1120491. But see A.T. II, 98 N.Y.S.3d at 380-
81 (holding “AO d[id] not appear amenable to services but rather appear[ed] to 
thwart any efforts at rehabilitation” where the AO failed to comply with the 
conditions of release and lead a law-abiding life, failed to report to the 
probation department, and failed to appear in court for subsequent 
proceedings). 
143.  See D.P., 2019 WL 1120491, at *7-8 (stating that, separate from the 
then-pending case, consequences for the then-current alleged parole violation 
could be disposed of at a parole revocation hearing, where Defendant would 
face placement in the event of revocation). 
144.  A.G., 2018 WL 7120259, at *6-7. Here, AO had five matters in 
Queens Supreme Court and Queens Criminal Court in addition to the case at 
hand. The court reasoned that “[t]his could lead to the likelihood of different 
and/or duplicative judicial processes and outcomes, which would not be in the 
interest of justice for the community or the defendant. Moreover, a global 
disposition of all matters in the Youth Part would provide a consistent outcome 
for defendant’s potential rehabilitation.” Id.; accord A.T. II, 98 N.Y.S.3d at 381 
(“As set forth in the People’s moving papers, committing a violent felony 
offense while at liberty on another pending charge, and the subsequent failure 
to appear although provided notice to do so is remarkable. Additionally, the 
Court must consider the third felony charge filed against AO, albeit after the 
filing of this motion, since that charge was filed prior to the hearing.”). 
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to engage in such an analysis as outside of the judiciary’s 
purview pursuant to a relevant statute.145  In People v. M.M., the 
Court “[wa]s not persuaded to rely on the AO’s juvenile 
delinquency records” although it was “mindful” of a sister court’s 
decision, i.e. the J.P. Court’s decision.146 It outlined the following 
reasons for its departure from the J.P. court’s reasoning: 
 
First, because the court in J.P. did not 
address [N.Y. Family Court Act (“FCA”)] 
§ 381.2[1] in its decision, it is possible that the 
Bronx court was not aware of FCA § 381.2[1]’s 
prohibition against the use of juvenile 
delinquency records.147 Second, this Court, 
respectfully, is not bound by the decision of a 
justice of coordinate jurisdiction (citations 
omitted).  Finally, this Court notes that even after 
taking into consideration the AO’s juvenile 
delinquency history, the court in J.P. nonetheless 
found that the People had failed to demonstrate 
“extraordinary circumstances” and ordered that 
the AO’s case be removed to the Family Court. If 
the fact that an individual was previously 
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent is to be 
considered in assessing factors against him with 
respect to the potential removal of a case from the 
Youth Part to the Family Court, then such 
consideration must be specifically authorized by 
the Legislature, not by this Court (citations 
omitted).148 
 
Given that courts are looking to statutes and other 
 
145.  See M.M. II, 99 N.Y.S.3d 858, 866 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019). 
146.  Id.; see supra notes 126-27, 130-32. See generally People v. J.P., 95 
N.Y.S.3d 731 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019). 
147.  M.M. II, 99 N.Y.S.3d at 865 (“[T]he Court of Appeals cited to FCA 
§ 381.2[1] for the proposition that ‘[a]s a rule, a juvenile delinquency 
adjudication cannot be used against the juvenile in any other court for any 
other purpose.’ The rationale behind FCA § 381.2 is that ‘[d]elinquency 
proceedings are designed not just to punish the malefactor but also to 
extinguish the causes of juvenile delinquency through rehabilitation and 
treatment.’” (citations omitted)). 
148.  Id. at 866–67. 
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authority to clarify and cultivate the significance of the 
extraordinary circumstances term, it is not unexpected that 
courts, like that in M.M., turned to the Family Court Act for 
guidance on this issue, even if such an approach diverges from 
those of other courts and judges.  However, the M.M. court’s 
unprecedented149 approach in light of other reported AO cases 
discussed herein begs the question whether the discretion 
afforded judges to hone the RTA law’s definition of extraordinary 
circumstances will effectuate inconsistencies in the 
administration of the RTA law from the outset, and therefore 
create another source of unpredictability for AOs in the juvenile 
justice system.  As the state edges forward in the 
implementation of the RTA legislation for New York’s 
seventeen-year-old AOs, it will be interesting to see whether 
tilting the scale towards removing ostensibly non-violent and/or 
violent felony cases into family court based upon an inclusive 
definition of extraordinary circumstances, like the approach 
taken in R.M.,150 or an exclusive approach, similar to that taken 
in M.M.,151 will better achieve the goals of the RTA legislation, 
which seeks to rehabilitate all juvenile offenders in a consistent 
manner while respecting the traditional underpinnings of the 
criminal justice system. 
 
b. Defining Significant Physical Injury under N.Y. CPL 
§ 722.23(2)(c)(i) 
 
Unlike the State Assembly’s anticipatory commentary 
delineating how courts may interpret extraordinary 
circumstances on an ad hoc basis, its discussions surrounding 
the definition of significant physical injury have been less 
enlightening, perhaps due to the fact that “the Legislature 
specifically contemplated, at least with regard to the definition 
of significant physical injury, that the Courts would fill the void 
left by the Legislature.”152  Despite the lack of guidance from the 
 
149.  At the time of this writing, and as to the reported cases only. 
150.  See People v. R.M., 94 N.Y.S.3d 764 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Dec. 
14, 2018). 
151.  See M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d 426 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. Mar. 21, 2019). 
152.  B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d 855, 859 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2018) (citing 
Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118) (“Considering the absence of clear 
guidance from the Legislature, the Court has looked to existing case law to 
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Legislature, courts have gradually defined significant physical 
injury in the context of adolescent matters on a case-by-case 
basis using their broad discretion under the statute. 
As expected, some physical injuries are easily recognized as 
significant by the courts, while others are more difficult to 
capture under the terminology.  For instance, since “it would 
defy logic to argue that causing the death of a person was not 
the serious criminal conduct contemplated by the legislature to 
warrant retention of [a] criminal case by the Youth Part,” the 
injury of death is certainly a significant physical injury as 
required under CPL § 722.23(2)(i).153  Exclusive of lethal 
injuries, a prevailing “working definition” of significant physical 
injuries has emerged.154  In its debate prior to the passage of the 
RTA legislation, the State Assembly referenced that significant 
physical injury would involve “bone fractures, injuries requiring 
surgery, and injuries resulting in disfigurement.”155  Some 
courts have opined that such injuries fall within the definition 
of significant physical injuries because they arise from the use 
of a weapon,156 while others have used the allegation of the use 
of a weapon only to reinforce a conclusion that a significant 
 
define these terms.”); see also People v. A.S., No. FYC-70002-19/001, 2019 WL 
722905, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. Jan. 15, 2019) (“RTA does not define 
significant physical injury. Thus, significant physical injury must be 
determined on a case by case basis.”). 
153.  People v. G.C., 94 N.Y.S.3d 795, 798 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Feb. 
7, 2019). 
154.  See B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 860; A.S., 2019 WL 722905; People v. 
E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d 743 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019). 
155.  B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, 
at 26, 29); accord A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2 (reasoning that legislative 
history also suggests that significant physical injury would be “more serious 
than a bruise”); E.B.M., 2019 WL 1052201, at *4. However, the Assembly 
Record of Proceedings makes clear such aggravating facts may exist alone, e.g., 
“a bone fracture need not require surgery to be considered an aggravating 
factor” in the determination of whether significant physical injury exists. 
People v. Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d 839, 842 (Cty. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2019) (citing 
Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118).  
156.  B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 860-61 (holding that significant physical 
injury existed where the complainant’s injury arose from the AO’s adult co-
defendant’s use of weapons, including, a golf club carried by the AO, a long 
stick, a baseball bat, and a hammer). The Court also held the AO did not 
possess or display a deadly weapon, but found the victim suffered significant 
physical injury nonetheless. Id. at 861. The Court in B.H. I made mention of 
weapons that would cause significant physical injury to include: a firearm, 
samurai sword, or belt. Id.  
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physical injury is present from other alleged facts.157  Yet, the 
use of a weapon is not necessary to support a finding that an AO 
caused significant physical injury as contemplated by the 
statute.158 
Furthermore, although the Legislature suggested that a 
definition of significant physical injury could be ascertained by 
a comparison to the standard for injury in no-fault insurance law 
cases, which necessitates a permanent injury,159 this standard 
has been rejected as “too stringent for the criminal law 
context.”160  In other words, the fact that a victim may fully 
recover from an injury or not suffer any permanent effect 
therefrom does not preclude a finding of significant physical 
injury and assigning criminal liability accordingly.161  The 
prevailing definition, inclusive of the aforementioned factors, 
has placed “significant physical injury” between “physical 
injury” as defined by New York Penal Law § 10.00(9), 
“impairment of a physical condition or substantial pain,” and 
 
157. A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2-3 (holding that the allegation of the use 
of a firearm in causing the complainant to suffer lacerations to his head which 
required staples to close the wound and suffer a broken wrist would clearly fall 
within the meaning of significant physical injury, even though a firearm was 
not uncovered during the investigation). But see People v. L.L., FYC-700**-10-
001, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4277, at *3, 12 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. July 19, 
2019) (failing to discuss staples victim had put in to close head laceration 
incurred as a result of the AO’s alleged use of force and a B.B. gun, which AO 
admitted to possessing, after court found AO did not “display [a weapon] in 
furtherance of such offense”). 
158.  E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 745-46, 749 (holding that each AO co-
defendant, while acting in concert with their adult co-defendants and others, 
to rob one victim caused significant physical injury when they punched, kicked, 
and stomped the victim in the face numerous times causing him to sustain a 
fractured nose, fractured orbital bone, a concussion, and swelling to the eyes 
and face); Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d at 841-42 (finding significant physical injury 
where the victim sustained “a nasal bone fracture, associated soft tissues [sic] 
swelling, and frontal scalp swelling” and required several days’ hospitalization 
after the AO co-defendants taunted, punched, and kicked him repeatedly in 
the head). 
159.  B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 861 (“Serious physical injuries are found, in 
no-fault cases, in two circumstances. The first is where an individual suffers 
the ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member.’ The 
second is where an individual suffers the ‘significant limitation of use of a body 
function or system.’”). 
160.  Id.  
161.  Id. (holding that despite complainant’s recovery from being stabbed 
six times and hit in the head with a baseball bat, and the ensuing facial 
paralysis, the injuries constituted significant physical injuries). 
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New York Penal Law § 10.00(10), “physical injury which creates 
a substantial risk of death or which causes death or serious and 
protracted disfigurement, . . . impairment of health or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
organ.”162  It appears that positioning the meaning of the 
“significant physical injury” term between these provisions of 
the Penal Code, along with the other circumstances mentioned 
above, will afford courts a narrow breadth in which to exercise 
their discretion to interpret a clear, consistent rule to find 
“significant physical injury” in future AO cases, including those 
involving seventeen-year-old AOs as of October 1, 2019. 
Moreover, it is unequivocal that, pursuant to the RTA 
statute, a determination that the AO caused the significant 
physical injury during the alleged commission of a violent felony 
is required under this prong of the three-part test, a 
consideration which has especially come to the fore in cases 
where the AO allegedly acted in concert with other offenders.163  
That is not to say, however, that courts agree that the AO must 
have been the “sole” actor in causing such injury164: at least one 
 
162.  A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9), (10) 
(McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652); see also B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 861; E.B.M., 
95 N.Y.S.3d at 747-48. 
163.  N.Y. CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(i) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652). 
164.  Interestingly, the same portions of the New York Assembly Records 
memorializing the debate on the RTA legislation, specifically accomplice 
liability, have been cited by courts on opposite sides of the issue of causation of 
a victim’s alleged significant physical injury. Compare Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d at 
842-43, n.5 (citing Assemb.  Proceedings, supra note 118, at 51-52, as basis for 
holding that AO need not be “sole actor”), with B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d 856, 861 
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at 
51) (“[T]he Assembly’s main sponsor of the Bill states that the three factor test 
‘required the defendant to be the sole actor who causes the conduct outlined. . . 
. The Legislative history states that this is consistent with the spirit of the law 
because ‘kids happen to get in trouble together all the time’ and the Assembly 
did not want to punish an entire group for ‘one bad apple.’”). The relevant 
portion of the Assembly Record of Proceedings reads as follows: 
[Assemblyperson] Quart: . . . [“W]ould [the three-part] test 
also disqualify those [AO defendants from removal] who are 
just present or nearby during the alleged offense or 
occurrence?” 
[Assemblyperson] Lentol: “No. This test requires that the 
defendant be the sole actor [sic] who causes the conduct 
outlined in the test. Again . . . you can understand why we 
want to do that, because kids happen to get in trouble 
together all the time and may – it may be just the one guy 
that really is the bad one – bad apple in the group, and we 
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court has held that “causation should not be so narrowly defined 
as requiring a ‘sole’ actor,”165 while other courts have given 
ample weight to this factor in determining removal actions.166 
Unlike the definition of significant physical injury, the 
incongruous levels of significance that courts have given to the 
causation portion of the significant physical injury prong 
suggests that there will, nonetheless, be inconsistent outcomes 
throughout the state on this issue as the state moves forward 
with implementing the RTA law for seventeen-year-olds.  
Additionally, these expected inconsistencies further clarify that 
the Legislature’s decision—to accord judges presiding over AO 
matters broad discretion to shape the terms of the statute—may 
certainly lead to uneven application of the RTA law throughout 
New York. 
 
c. Interpreting Displayed in Furtherance of an Offense in 
Adolescent Offender Matters under N.Y. CPL 
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii) 
 
At the time of this writing, the meaning of the term 
displayed under the second prong of the three-factor test, which 
automatically retains an AO matter in the Youth Part, has been 
substantially fleshed out by the courts.167  One opinion 
 
don’t want to punish all of them. It would also disqualify the 
[AO] defendant who directly caused the injury, who displayed 
the weapon in his or [her] [own] hand, and who personally 
engaged in the unlawful sexual conduct.” 
Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at 51-52. The disparity between these 
opinions highlights the inconsistency in reasoning and dispositions of AO 
matters due, at least partially, to the discretion imparted to judges presiding 
over RTA cases. 
165.  Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d at 842-43 (distinguishing Y.L.’s facts from those 
in J.M., where the court reasoned the Legislature intended that the defendant 
be the sole actor). 
166.  B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 861 (ordering removal of the matter to family 
court because, inter alia, there was no evidence in the record that the AO was 
the sole actor); cf. A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2 (holding retention warranted 
where AO co-defendants “together struck the complainant in the head with a 
‘black pistol’ causing complainant to suffer” significant physical injury 
(emphasis added)); E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 749 (holding retention in Youth Part 
was warranted because the State established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that “each AO co-defendant was personally responsible for directly 
causing Victim #1’s ‘significant physical injuries’” (emphasis added)). 
167.  See N.Y. CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652) 
(“the defendant displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon as defined 
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encompassing the evidently accepted definition of “display” in 
the context of the RTA legislation derives from a decision after 
the AO’s sixth-day hearing in the case of People v. M.M., where 
the Court ascertained the legislative intent and construed the 
pertinent statutes to effectuate that intent168 by turning to the 
plain meaning of the word “display”169 before determining that 
the statute requires that the People must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the AO showed or “exhibited 
ostentatiously an actual firearm or deadly weapon as defined in 
the [P]enal [L]aw.”170  Citing Legislative intent, the M.M. Court 
held it would be “illogical for [it] to construe CPL 
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii) in a way that expands the reach of the provision 
to cases that would otherwise proceed toward automatic removal 
to the Family Court under CPL § 722.23(1)(a).”171  Moreover, 
generally, the argument proffered by prosecutors that “what the 
victim perceives to be a firearm, including situations where the 
AO’s words or actions suggest it is a firearm,”172 should be 
included under “displayed” has been rejected by Youth Parts, 
since “[n]othing in the plain language of the statute indicates 
that CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii) is intended to extend cases where the 
 
in the penal law in furtherance of the offense.”). 
168.  M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d 426 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. Mar. 21, 2019). As of 
this decision, M.M. was charged by way of three felony complaints, two of 
which respectively charged M.M. with one count of Robbery in the First 
Degree, a class B felony, and the remaining complaint charging M.M. with 
Robbery in the Third Degree for a total of two class B felonies and one class D 
felony lodged against the AO. Id. at 427. M.M. was later charged by way of a 
fourth felony company with one count of Robbery in the First Degree. M.M. II, 
99 N.Y.S.3d 858, 860 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019). 
169.  M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 432; People v. D.G., No. FYC-70228-19, 2019 
WL 2455461, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. Apr. 4, 2019) (“[A]s a noun, the 
word ‘display’ means a setting or presentation of something in open view . . . . 
As a verb, it means[] to disport, exhibit, expose, flash, flaunt, lay out, parade, 
produce, show, show off, sport, strut, and unveil.”). 
170.  M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 432 (emphasis added). 
171.  Id.; accord D.G., 2019 WL 2455461, at *12. 
172.  M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 429; People v. W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, 
at *8-9 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Aug. 19, 2019) (“[U]nlike the Penal Law inclusive 
language allowing prosecution for Robbery in the first degree for ‘what appears 
to be a firearm . . . or deadly weapon,’ the legislature under CPL 
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii) uses unequivocal language requiring an actual ‘display of a 
firearm or deadly weapon’ to avoid removal.”). The Court in D.G. similarly 
stated that the Legislature intended that this definition required “something 
more than to merely ‘display what appears to be a firearm or deadly weapon.’” 
2019 WL 2455461, at *11. 
41
496 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.1 
AO has not displayed an actual firearm . . . “173 
Thus, growing case law reveals that satisfaction of the prong 
that the AO “display” a firearm in furtherance of the alleged 
violent offense requires the accusatory instrument to sufficiently 
plead that the AO displayed an actual firearm, shotgun, rifle, or 
other deadly weapon,174 which would be bolstered by the 
recovery of such a weapon,175 evidence the complainant 
sustained injuries that match that which would be caused by a 
weapon,176 and/or other evidence or circumstances pertinent to 
the determination, including, but not limited to: eyewitness(es), 
clothing which tests positive for gunshot primer residue,177 et 
cetera.  It is not untenable that the prevailing interpretation of 
the term displayed will be sustained in future decisions 
throughout the state as it preserves the courts’ common trend 
 
173.  M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 430; See also D.G., 2019 WL 2455461, at *4 
(holding People did not meet their burden to prove that the object displayed 
was in fact, an actual firearm and ordering removal of the matter to family 
court); W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, at *11-12 (holding retention in Youth 
Part appropriate where the People met burden and AO did not challenge or 
provide proof to contradict the alleged display of a loaded silver twenty-five 
caliber semi-automatic pistol). 
174.  For example, a B.B. gun is a “deadly weapon” as defined by N.Y. 
Penal Law section 10.00(12). People v. A.T. (A.T. I), 94 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (Fam. 
Ct. Erie Cty. 2019). But see A.T. II, 98 N.Y.S.3d 377, 378-79 (Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. 
2019) (court previously held People failed to meet the requirements of CPL 
§ 722.23(2)(c) where the same AO, along with co-defendants, in the course of 
the commission of the alleged crime did place a screwdriver at the back of the 
complainant’s head and threaten immediate use thereof). 
175.  See A.T. I, 94 N.Y.S.3d at 432 (holding that retention of the matter 
in the Youth Part was warranted since the AO used or threatened the use of 
physical force and actually displayed a black and silver BB gun while allegedly 
committing a robbery, which was recovered); W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, 
at *11-12 (twenty-five caliber semi-automatic pistol was recovered); see also 
People v. L.L., FYC-700**-10-001, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4277, at *12-13 (Sup. 
Ct. Queens Cty. July 19, 2019) (removed to family court because, inter alia, no 
gun recovered). But see D.G., 2019 WL 2455461, at *13 (“And although this 
Court is not holding that a firearm must be recovered and or discharged in 
order for the People to meet their burden . . . the People’s mere recitation of 
the facts as outlined in the complaint, and bald assertions that the 
Complainant perceived what she believed to be a black colored firearm, at 
night, standing alone, falls woefully short of the Legislative intent.”). 
176.  L.M., 2019 WL 1187308, at *4 (holding that case should remain in 
the Youth Part the AO possessed and fired five shots from a loaded pistol, of 
which one shot struck the complaining witness and became lodged in their 
abdomen); People v. G.C., 94 N.Y.S.3d 795, 798 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Feb. 
7, 2019) (autopsy report stated death was caused by a bullet wound). 
177.  See id. 
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toward effectuating the progressive legislative intent of the RTA 
legislation and its presumption of removal to family court. 
However, it is worth noting that proof that the AO did, in 
fact, display an actual weapon may not sustain the burden of 
proof to retain the AO matter in the Youth Part automatically, 
according to growing case law.  There remains the issue relative 
to the second half of the CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii)—whether the AO 
displayed said weapon “in furtherance of the offense” alleged.  At 
the time of this writing, there is only one reported decision 
explicitly discussing the “in furtherance of the offense” piece of 
this prong of the three-part test, People v. N.C. (No. 70335-2019, 
2019 WL 5199478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. Oct. 4, 2019)).178  
There, despite finding that the prosecution did establish that the 
AO brandished an actual, operable firearm during the incident 
in question and that a firearm was recovered which matched the 
shell casings of bullets fired, the Court nevertheless found that 
the People failed to prove that the AO displayed the firearm in 
furtherance of either of the violent felonies the AO was charged 
with and ordered the case be removed to family court.179  It 
reasoned that “[r]equiring that the People prove that an 
adolescent’s display of a firearm was done in order to ‘advance 
or promote’ the underlying felony with which the adolescent is 
charged ensures that all but the most serious cases are in fact 
subject to the automatic removal provisions of the ‘Raise the Age’ 
statute,”180 in line with the intent of the RTA law. 
Yet, the N.C. Court’s reasoning effectuated a result that 
does not exactly comport with prior decisions of sister courts 
disposing of AO matters in the context of CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii). 
Specifically, as to the charge of Attempted Criminal Possession 
 
178.  In People v. N.C., No. 70335-2019, 2019 WL 5199478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Bronx Cty. Oct. 4, 2019), the AO was charged with Attempted Murder in the 
Second Degree (and related charges) and with Attempted Criminal Possession 
of a Weapon in the Second Degree (and related charges) in connection with an 
incident where the AO allegedly (a) made a hand-to-hand exchange with an 
unapprehended individual who had just displayed a .380 caliber, semi-
automatic pistol, and fired approximately seven shots in the direction of an 
individual who was shot twice; (b) removed a .380 caliber pistol from his shorts 
pocket and pointed it in the direction of an unknown individual before cocking 
the pistol’s hammer; and (c) held the pistol, ran behind a marked police car, 
and abandoned the pistol there, where it would be recovered by police. Id. at 
*2-5. 
179.  Id. at *10-12. 
180.  Id. at *10-11. 
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of a Weapon, the N.C. Court expressed doubt regarding “how 
pointing the firearm furthered the defendant’s attempted 
possession of a loaded and operable firearm,” and rejected the 
implication of the People’s argument, that “whenever an 
adolescent displays a firearm, he or she [must be] ‘furthering’ 
the commission of the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon 
or Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon.”181  It reasoned 
that accepting such a position “would deprive the words, ‘in 
furtherance of,’ of any meaning or effect, as all cases in which an 
adolescent displayed a firearm would fall within [CPL 
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii)].”182  Conversely, the Court in W.H. previously 
held that the defendant there indeed displayed a firearm in 
furtherance of essentially the same offense N.C. was charged 
with—criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.183  
Moreover, according to the published decision, W.H. did not even 
point the gun at someone, it was recovered from inside his jacket 
by a police officer upon his arrest after the officer observed W.H. 
to have “possessed a shiny silver object, which defendant tried 
to conceal in his jacket as he ran from the [officer].”184  These 
disparate cases offer a thought-provoking comparison, since 
after all, if examining an unlawful possession of a firearm 
charge, actual possession of such a firearm does not fall under 
the “in furtherance of” term, then what does? 
Although it is expected that courts will differ in their 
decisions under the RTA law, given the vast discretion afforded 
Youth Part judges who must give meaning to vague, undefined 
terms like displayed and in furtherance of, inconsistent 
interpretations of all of the ambiguous terms in the legislation 
may lead to unequal, uncertain results in a juvenile justice 
system that is in the process of being overhauled in and outside 
of court. 
 
V. Remedying the Defects in the Sealing & Removal 
 
181.  Id. at *11-12. 
182.  Id. at *12. 
183.  People v. W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, at *11 (Sup. Ct. Queens 
Cty. Aug. 19, 2019). As discussed supra, see note 178, N.C. was charged with 
Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree. N.C., 2019 
WL 5199478 at *1-2; see also W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, at *2, *11 
(defendant was charged with two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon 
in the Second Degree). 
184.  Id. at *11. 
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Provisions of the Raise the Age Law Going Forward 
 
Although the Raise the Age legislation’s progressive 
orientation has been viewed as a triumph of the juvenile 
criminal justice system by some, critics have suggested that the 
law is incomplete, or “half a loaf,” resulting in the challenges for 
courts, as discussed above, and other facets of New York’s 
criminal justice system.185  In light of the emerging defects of the 
law and judicial opinions reaching out to the Legislature for 
remedies to the RTA provisions since their enactment, future 
changes in the landscape of the juvenile justice system under the 
RTA legislation is vital.  In the following subsections, this article 
will highlight a few proposals that may remedy the defects in the 
law and assuage the concerns of critics and courts alike. 
 
A. The Judiciary’s Call for Amendments to the Raise the 
Age Law’s Sealing Provision & the Legislature’s 
Forthcoming Response 
 
Because the RTA legislation is currently being administered 
by the courts, opinions discussing the sealing provision have 
shed light upon grey areas of the law that can be tailored to 
better suit the goals of the progressive law.  Judge Joseph A. 
Zayas of the Supreme Court of Queens County has opined that 
there are “several reasons to question the wisdom of [the] 
categorial approach to sealing eligibility,” including, producing 
seemingly inequitable outcomes, and failing to explicitly address 
criminal records of younger offenders, even though the sealing 
statute that was enacted as part of the RTA legislation is overtly 
geared toward those offenders.186  He illustrated this inequity 
through the description of a case where because a defendant 
pleaded to a lesser charge he was able to seal his robbery 
conviction “which was violent by any reasonable definition of the 
word,” in stark contrast with the results of Jane Doe and John 
Doe, discussed in Part II(ii), supra.187  Judge Zayas called upon 
 
185.  Hager, supra note 49 (quoting State Sen. Kevin Parker of Brooklyn). 
186.  People v. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d 594, 597-98 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 
2018). 
187.  Id. See Andrew Denny, Queens Judge to Lawmakers: “Raise the Age” 
Sealing Law Needs More Work, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 12, 2018), 
http://raisetheageny.com/newitem/queens-judge-lawmakers-raise-age-sealing-
45
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the Legislature to revise the sealing statute to ameliorate 
troublesome outcomes like that in Jane Doe, since the disparities 
it produces can be the product of factors beyond the defendant’s 
control, such as the prosecution’s discretion in offering plea 
bargains and the trial judge’s discretion to resolve a case by 
deeming the defendant a Youthful Offender.188  His suggestions 
to amend the RTA law include 
 
[e]xpand[ing] sealing eligibility to convictions of 
violent felony offenses that were committed when 
the defendant was younger than nineteen, 
provided that, at the time of conviction, the 
defendant was eligible to be adjudicated as a 
youthful offender.  Because sealing eligibility in 
New York is relatively strict, there would [be] 
little risk that a truly violent, antisocial person 
would be eligible for relief.189 
 
Assemblywoman Aravella Simotas has answered the 
Queens Supreme Court’s calls to amend the RTA legislation, at 
least in part, by announcing her plan to propose a bill that would 
expand the sealing provision by allowing individuals to apply for 
their records to be sealed if they were eligible to be treated as a 
Youthful Offender in the past, but were denied that status, 
clearly alluding to the compelling case of Jane Doe.190  Because 
of the discretionary nature of the designation of Youthful 
Offender status, which is determined at sentencing and would 
allow for automatic sealing of the Youthful Offender’s records, 
 
law-needs-work (“The judge said he recently granted a sealing application in 
another case in which the defendant was [nineteen] when he and an accomplice 
allegedly committed a robbery in which they assaulted the victim, but who 
later pleaded guilty to third-degree robbery, an eligible offense under the 
sealing statute.”). 
188.  Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 597. 
189.  Id. at 599. 
190.  Dan M. Clark, Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Expand Protections in 
‘Raise the Age’ Law, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 31, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/01/31/lawmaker-proposes-bill-
to-expand-protections-in-nys-raise-the-age-law/ (“Youthful offender status has 
been available to defendants as young as 16 years old but younger than 19 
years old in New York since 1971, when the Legislature passed a bill creating 
the classification. Certain violent or serious crimes may prevent that person 
from being classified as a youthful offender.”).  
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state lawmaker Simotas’ proposal would address the disparity 
identified by the court in Jane Doe to effectuate sealing of 
criminal records not only for future AOs, but also retroactively 
for movants with convictions that are more likely to have met 
the ten-year conviction-free requirement to be eligible for 
sealing.  Simotas’ anticipated bill obliges defendants to meet the 
same requirements as AOs to be eligible for sealing, affording all 
juvenile offenders eligibility proportionate to that of offenders 
falling under the newly enacted law and giving “people who 
committed crimes in their youth the chance to become full 
members of society in adulthood [by] grant[ing them] the chance 
to move beyond the burden of a criminal record.”191  Moreover, 
lawmakers in Albany have discussed shortening the ten-year 
period defendants seeking to seal their record must wait before 
applying in order to afford younger defendants more 
opportunities in the job market at an earlier age.192,193 
 
B. Proposal for Clarification of the Ambiguous Terminology 
in the Raise the Age Legislation 
 
In order to avoid contravening the rehabilitative and 
forward-looking goals of the RTA law, the Legislature should set 
forth explicit explanations to confirm the definitions created by 
the courts on a case-by-case basis, perhaps in the form of 
Legislative commentary to the RTA legislation itself or outright 
amendments to the law.  Not only will this clear up the 
amorphous definitions of the terminology which is intrinsic to 
the administration of the RTA’s provision with regard to AOs, 
but it will aid in providing an objective rule to a wide range of 
circumstances that begin in the already unfamiliar setting of the 
 
191.  Id. (quoting Assemb. Aravella Simotas). 
192.  Id. At the time of writing, these discussions appear to be ongoing.  
193.  Additionally, New York’s Youthful Offender law provides the 
opportunity for youth under the age of nineteen to have a criminal conviction 
set aside and replaced with a confidential, non-criminal outcome, and to have 
reduced prison sentences; however, these protections are no longer available 
once a youth reaches the age of nineteen. See Agenda for Achieving Youth 
Justice, supra note 67, at 2. Organizations and leaders throughout the state 
are working toward strengthening existing protections under the Youthful 
Offender law to create a new “Young Adult Status,” which would cover young 
adults up to the age of twenty-five, shielding them from incurring lifelong 
criminal records that create barriers to education, jobs, and housing for 
youthful mistakes. Id. 
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Youth Parts of adult criminal courts.194  Furthermore, issuing 
commentary to the RTA law would be feasible in light of the 
resources and mechanisms available to the Legislature 
including criminal and family court advisory committees which 
provide a forum that possesses the necessary acumen for 
effective discussions to discover and implement resolutions of 
pertinent issues.195 
 
VI. After-Thoughts 
 
It is incontrovertible that in its first year, the RTA 
legislation has been regarded as a resounding success for New 
York’s juvenile justice system.196  As of October 1, 2019, New 
York no longer treats juveniles under the age of eighteen-years-
old as adults in the state criminal system automatically, 
completing the state’s timeline for the complete transition under 
the RTA legislation.197  Although it has been noted that New 
 
194.  One court’s approach to remedying inconsistent outcomes combined 
the dictionary definition of extraordinary in conjunction with all other factors 
“in the interest of applying an objective defined standard to a fluid set of 
circumstances,” People v. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d 731, 742 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019); 
however, it is not guaranteed that all courts will employ the same logic. 
195.  See generally N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Judiciary’s Legislative 
Reform: Advisory Committee Reports Archive, N.Y. COURTS, 
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/ip/judiciaryslegislative/archive.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2019). The most recent Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Law and Procedure reveals the Committee has already called for clarification 
of a portion of the sealing law under CPL sections 160.58, 160.59. See generally 
N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. LAW AND PROC., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2019), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/IP/judiciaryslegislative/pdfs/2019-
CriminalLaw.pdf. 
196.   See, e.g., Devon Magliozzi, Early Progress of Cuomo’s Youth Justice 
Overhaul Looks Positive, ITHACA VOICE (Sept. 27, 2019), https:// 
ithacavoice.com/2019/09/raise-the-age-early-progress-of-cuomos-youth-justice-
overhaul-looks-positive/; Devon Magliozzi, New York’s Raise The Age Overhaul 
Wins Early Praise, CRIME REP., https://thecrimereport.org/2019/09/24/ 
youth-justice-overhaul-in-new-york-state-wins-early-praise/ (Sept. 24, 2019); 
see generally Updates: News, RAISE THE AGE NY, https://raisetheageny.org/ 
category/news/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).  
197.  Governor Cuomo Announces Second Phase of Raise the Age Law Now 
in Effect, N.Y. STATE: GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Oct. 1, 2019) 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-second-phase-
raise-age-law-now-effect; see Agenda for Achieving Youth Justice, supra note 
67, at 2. 
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York’s RTA “comes amid an already rapidly shrinking justice 
system,”198 the statistics gathered since its implementation for 
sixteen-year-old offenders underscore the overall success of the 
legislation thus far.  The Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice has 
reported that: “[b]uilding on this success [of the shrinking justice 
system], the first nine months under the new law saw 
misdemeanor arrests of sixteen-year-olds decline sixty-one 
percent compared to the same time period from October 2017 to 
June 2018.”199  Furthermore, during the first year since RTA 
law’s enactment, nearly eighty percent of sixteen-year-old AOs 
have been arraigned in the Youth Part and removed to Family 
Court, in line with the general intent of the Legislation.200  
Specifically, as to the period from October 2019 to March 2019, 
eighty-two percent of such cases were removed to Family Court 
or Probation according to a report issued in August 2019 by the 
State’s RTA Task Force, which oversees the law’s 
implementation.201  Furthermore, over the past two years, it has 
been reported that more than 1,000 individuals have taken 
advantage of the sealing provisions of the RTA law, according to 
the State, proving that the law’s rehabilitative focus is taking 
effect.202 
Nevertheless, as the implementation and execution of the 
RTA legislation forges onward, there remain issues to be 
cognizant of in order to ensure the intent behind the law is 
effectively realized.203  One issue which has been recognized by 
 
198.  City of N.Y., supra note 51.  
199.  Id. 
200.  See id.  
201.  Dan M. Clark, NY Courts Ready as Second Phase of ‘Raise the Age’ 
Law Takes Effect, Officials Say, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 1, 2019 12:27 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/10/01/ny-courts-ready-as-
second-phase-of-raise-the-age-law-takes-effect-officials-say/. 
202.  Id.   
203.  As mentioned previously, supra note 1, this Article would not do 
justice to discussing other issues surrounding the implementation of the Raise 
the Age legislation that would be more fully disposed of in another law review 
article. However, as to the housing and facilities issues under the RTA, it is 
praiseworthy that with the decline in arrests of those under the age of 
eighteen-years-old, “New York’s approach to youth justice and its 
simultaneous sharp drops in both youth incarceration and youth crime, call 
into question the need for youth prisons that dominate so much of youth justice 
landscape throughout the rest of the country.” City of N.Y., supra note 51 
(quoting Vincent Schiraldi, former Commissioner of N.Y.C. Probation and co-
Director of the Columbia University Justice Lab). As such, it is not untenable 
49
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those overseeing the execution of the RTA, for instance, is 
whether there will be accessible magistrates to hear AO matters 
in a timely manner as is required under the statute.  Deputy 
Administrative Judge Edwina Mendelson, who leads the Office 
for Justice Initiatives in the Office of Court Administration, has 
made assurances that the state’s family courts are ready for the 
processing of seventeen-year-old AOs as the second phase of the 
RTA is implemented, and that she does not foresee that courts 
will be unable to successfully absorb AO cases accordingly with 
currently available resources, including jurists.204  However, to 
the extent such issues will come to fruition in connection with 
the anticipated influx of seventeen-year-old AOs,205 they are 
preemptively being curtailed by changes in court operations 
which undercut the need for additional accessible magistrates, 
such as the creation of more opportunities for cases to go to 
family youth justice system diversion as an alternative to court 
filing.206,207 
 
to suggest that, perhaps, the RTA law will remedy some of these issues in due 
course over time.  
204.  Clark, supra note 202. Moreover, Judge Mendleson has been 
reported as saying that the courts are prepared to “watch very carefully as 
those [seventeen-year-old AO] cases come in and change resources as needed.” 
Id. Some “change[s] in resources” she referred to included the option to train 
State Supreme Court Justices to preside over the AO cases and designate them 
as Family Court Justices. Id.  
205.  Eileen Grench, Big Influx of 17-year-olds Poses Next ‘Raise the Age’ 
Test, CITY (Sept. 23, 2019) https://thecity.nyc/2019/09/influx-of-17-year-olds-
poses-raise-the-age-test-for-juvenile-justice-system.html.  
206.  Clark, supra note 202. Moreover, there is a procedure already in 
effect whereby AOs who previously had to wait for cases to be transferred to 
family court, because the Youth Part was not in session, can now skip that 
step. Id. As long as there is an accessible magistrate, and the prosecutor 
consents, a proceeding can avoid the criminal court altogether and instead 
proceed through the family justice system. Id. 
207.  Other fundamental, perhaps constitutional, issues have surfaced as 
the Raise the Age legislation has been implemented throughout the state, 
including, but not limited to: AOs’ rights to access to counsel while in custody 
of the police and/or state facilities, and/or prior to their arraignment and other 
court appearances; housing adolescents in solitary confinement; and the 
disparate treatment of New York’s thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-old 
offenders who, although younger than their AO counterparts, are not afforded 
the same treatment under RTA legislation. WWBA CLE, supra note 67; see 
N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Crimes Committed by Children Between 7-19, 
NYCOURTS.GOV, https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/crimesBy 
Children.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (describing Juvenile Deliquent(s) 
and Juvenile Offender(s) designations that apply to seven to sixteen-year-olds 
and thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds, respectively, and stating that Juvenile 
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As such, it is abundantly clear that there remain substantial 
pitfalls under the RTA Legislation which will have to be 
addressed, likely sooner rather than later due to their 
important, perhaps constitutional implications.  Nonetheless, 
there appears to be a strong foundation of case law, resources, 
and people readily able and willing to safeguard the intention 
behind the RTA law while dealing with the formulating issues 
aforementioned, some of which are already recognized today.208 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
New York’s enactment and implementation of the RTA law 
reflects the basic standard of decency to treat kids as kids, as 
has been understood across the nation and by this nation’s 
highest court for decades. Moreover, the RTA legislation marks 
a monumental step forward in New York’s efforts to create a 
more fair, commonsense juvenile justice system that will endure 
well into the future.  However, although the RTA legislation is 
an emblem for New York’s historic shift in juvenile justice, it is 
not without flaws that are ripe for redress by the courts, the 
Legislature, and those overseeing the statute’s implementation. 
With the second phase of the RTA law being applied for 
 
Offenders may be punished like adults).  Paradoxically, these offenders would 
invariably be younger than sixteen- and/or seventeen-year-old Adolescent 
Offenders and receive harsher treatment. Id. Though compelling and relevant 
to the RTA legislation, given this Article’s focus largely on the implementation 
and effect the RTA’s provisions are currently having in the State’s courts and 
attendant procedures, the far-reaching implications these issues contend with 
are a topic for another law review note, or several, where they can be discussed 
more fully. For Federal Cases arising from the Raise the Age legislation, see 
J.B. v. Onondaga Cty., No. 5:19-CV-137 (LEK/TWD), 2019 WL 3776377 
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2019) (granting AOs’ motion for class certification and a 
preliminary injunction against defendants to permit Adolescent Offenders and 
Juvenile Offenders to consult with their lawyers privately in the courthouse 
before their court appearances); Paykina v. Lewin, No. 9:19-cv-00061 
(BKS/DJS), 2019 WL 2329688 (N.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019) (awarding preliminary 
injunction against confinement in Adolescent Offender Separation Unit of AO 
with mental illness on grounds of cruel and unusual punishment). 
208.  For example, in New York City, the “Working Group” is present in 
all five boroughs, continues to meet regularly to monitor RTA’s progress, 
discuss ideas, and analyze trends. City of N.Y., supra note 51. The Working 
Group is comprised of the Administration for Children’s Services, Department 
of Correction, Department of Education, Department of Probation, NYPD, New 
York City Law Department, Office of Court Administration, Legal Aid Society, 
Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defenders, and the District Attorney’s Offices. Id. 
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seventeen-year-old offenders as of October 1, 2019, the onus falls 
on  the Legislature to provide the courts with the workable 
mechanisms delineating sealing AO criminal records for 
movants who have, by all accounts, outgrown their adolescent 
behavior; in the absence of such mechanisms, courts will have to 
apply ambiguous statutory language in removal proceedings 
moving forward.  The State would be remiss if it failed to address 
emerging challenges and concerns identified and evaluated by 
the courts, which, if unremedied, may permit the juvenile justice 
system to revert to its past illogical execution.  Because of the 
varied outcomes that are expected to result from judges’ 
discretion and authority to remedy the deficiencies of RTA 
legislation case by case, and the influx of AO cases which is 
certain to occur with the implementation of the second phase, an 
effective response is essential.  Not only is clarification vital to 
future processing of sealing and AO removal matters in the 
courts, it is also essential to the longevity and success of the RTA 
law altogether.  In the alternative, the State’s courts will 
continue to effectively displace the Legislature as to matters 
falling under the purview of RTA and legislate as they see fit 
from the proverbial bench. 
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